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THE EFFECTS OF MOOD AND PERCEIVED COST ON SELF-DISCLOSURE OF 
DEVIANT SEXUAL FANTASY AND BEHAVIOUR 
by 
JORDAN STUART MAILE 
Advisor: Professor Maureen Allwood 
The present study examined the effects of mood state (happy vs. neutral vs. sad) and 
perceptions of cost (anonymous vs. “non-anonymous”) on self-disclosure of deviant sexual 
fantasies and behavior (e.g. pedophilic, coercive). Research suggests that mood may affect 
decision making in “risky” situations, such that a positive mood state may increase risky decision 
making. It could be argued that disclosure of deviant sexual fantasies and behavior can be 
conceptualized as a “risky” situation; therefore, it is hypothesized that a positive mood state 
would increase disclosure of deviant sexual fantasies and behavior, but only when doing so is 
perceived to be “low” in cost (i.e., anonymous). Online survey data was collected from 331 adult 
male and female community members recruited through an online posting service, and online 
and print advertisements in a weekly commuter publication. Participants provided demographic 
information; had their cost perception related to disclosing manipulated via different assurances 
of anonymity (i.e., anonymous vs. “non-anonymous”); and were induced into a happy, sad, or 
neutral mood state via an emotionally valenced autobiographical memory recall task. Participants 
then answered questions about deviant sexual fantasies, masturbatory fantasies, and behaviours; 
and attitudes toward sexual material; social desirability; trait happiness; and trait sadness. Results 
found that high cost perception (i.e., “non-anonymous”), compared to low cost perception (i.e., 
anonymous), depressed the number and frequency of deviant sexual fantasies and masturbatory 
fantasies, but not behaviours, reported by participants. Mood did not significantly affect sexual 
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self-disclosure. These data suggest that an assurance of anonymity helps to facilitate sexual self-
disclosure, but may have an “upper limit” in its facilitative effect. This study was limited by a 
lack of statistical power and a relatively weak mood manipulation, both of which could be 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Much of social science research depends on the collection of socially sensitive 
information from research participants, such as political attitudes, drug use, and sexuality.  
However, response patterns to these types of questions, particularly those related to sexual 
material, may be prone to reporting biases due to the private and personal nature of the subject 
matter (Catania, Gibson, Chitwood, & Coates, 1990; Herold & Way, 1988). Thus, research that 
relies on sexual self-disclosure, such as HIV/AIDS research, sexual offender research, and even 
research that involves less stigmatized constructs, such as dating behavior, may be subject to 
reporting biases. This is particularly problematic given that these data are used to inform theory, 
prevention, and intervention efforts in these areas.  For example, obtaining accurate self-
disclosure of sexual behavior from community participants is vital in the understanding of 
transmission patterns of sexually transmitted infections, such as HIV.  In forensic settings, 
accurate self report from non-offending and sexual offending samples of both normative and 
deviant sexual fantasy and behavior are important for etiological theories of sexual offending and 
risk assessment and management. Therefore, it behooves researchers to know which factors may 
influence, and how they may influence, sexual self-disclosure patterns. Catania and his 
colleagues (1990) suggest that one factor that might influence sexual self-disclosure response 
patterns is mood.  
 Previous research on self-disclosure of sensitive material, such as sexuality, has largely 
neglected the role of mood and instead focused on factors such as question wording (e.g., Blair, 
Sudman, Bradburn, & Stocking, 1977; Catania et al., 1996); static intrapersonal factors, such as 
personality traits (e.g., Meston, Heiman, Trapnell, & Paulhus, 1998); and demographics (e.g., 
Wiederman, 1993).  In fact, over twenty years ago Catania and colleagues (1990) pointed out 
that no research had examined the potential impact of mood states on participant response 
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patterns on sexuality surveys; after a review of the current literature, this statement still holds 
true today. Therefore, research that addresses the impact of specific mood states on response 
patterns on sexual surveys would help to fill this gap in the literature. 
 The proposed study seeks to examine the effect of two mood states, happiness and 
sadness, on self-disclosure patterns of deviant sexual fantasies and behavior.  In the following 
sections, a general introduction of reporting bias in self-report surveys, and sexuality surveys 
more specifically, will be provided. This will be followed by an overview of the mood and risky 
decision making literature, providing a theoretical basis for the potential influence of mood on 
patterns of sexual self-disclosure, which can be conceptualized as a form of risky decision 
making. Next, a brief overview of research on the effect of mood on non-sexual self-disclosure, 
and potential moderaters of sexual self-disclosure, will be presented. The final sections will 
cover the methodology of the current study, the presentation and discussion of the results and 






CHAPTER 2: PROBLEMS WITH SELF-REPORT DATA 
 Self-report data has a long history of being criticized for proneness to distortion and 
inaccuracy; that is, individuals who complete self-report surveys often answer in ways that are 
not entirely honest. In the following sections, a definition of response bias and its various forms 
will be provided, followed by a more specific focus on response bias in sexuality research.  
Definition of Response Bias 
 Response bias is defined as "conditions or factors that take place during the process of 
responding to surveys, affecting the way responses are provided" (Villar, 2008) and has been a 
long-standing problem for survey researchers in the social sciences since the early twentieth 
century (e.g., Bernreuter, 1933 as cited in Meston, Heiman, Trapnell, & Paulhus, 1998). 
Response bias negatively impacts the accuracy of information collected in survey research, and 
can obscure or distort the relationship among variables under study. In a review of 14,275 self-
report survey-based research studies covering a range of topics, van de Mortel (2008) found that 
only 31 (0.2%) included a measure of response bias, and almost half of this subsample of studies 
was noted to have their results influenced by response bias.  
 Even more problematically, specific domains of information may be more prone to 
response bias than others due to the sensitive nature of the subject matter (King & Bruner, 2000). 
Response bias is more likely to occur when the topic under study is of a sensitive or private 
nature, such as sexuality (Catania et al., 1990; Rogers & Turner, 1991).  
Response Bias in Sexuality Research 
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Response bias is considered to be one of the major methodological issues plaguing 
sexuality research. Questions of a sexual nature are likely to induce feelings of embarrassment or 
threat in research participants, thereby increasing the likelihood that participants will 
inaccurately report about the phenomenon under study (Herold & Way, 1988). Response bias has 
been noted in sexuality research in both community and forensic settings.     
In community based research samples, response bias has been a notable problem in areas 
ranging from child sexual abuse to sexually transmitted infections (STIs). For example, one of 
the most enduring and problematic issues facing child sexual abuse research is accurately 
estimating its prevalence based on research participants self-report, with estimates ranging from 
3% to 62% (Gorey & Leslie, 1997). Gorey and Leslie (1997) opined that participant response 
bias was likely one of the major contributors to the variability in prevalence estimates for child 
sexual abuse.  
Similarly, understanding the accurate incidence and prevalence of high risk sexual 
behaviours (e.g., failure to use condoms) is critical in understanding transmission patterns of 
STIs; however, these behaviours are often underreported, ostensibly due to the stigma attached to 
these (Johnson et al., 2001). DiFrenceisco and colleagues (1998) noted that in a sample of urban 
American men who had sex with men (MSM), participants generally underreported high risk 
sexual behaviours, such as unprotected anal sex, that may put them at increased risk of 
transmitting or contracting HIV. This problem is not limited to just HIV, but all STIs (Langhaug, 
Sherr, & Cowan, 2010).   
In forensic research settings, accurate self-report of paraphilic fantasy and behaviour 
(e.g., pedophilic, coercive) in correctional and community samples is essential in understanding 
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the etiology, maintenance, treatment, and risk management of sexual offending behaviour. 
However, sex offender researchers note that the underreporting or denial of deviant sexual 
fantasy and behaviour is a frequent problem (Barbaree, 1991; Happell & Auffrey, 1995). For 
example, two studies found that juvenile sex offenders disclosed a greater number of sexual 
offences (Emerick & Dutton, 1993) and details related to their sexual offences (Harrison & Eliot, 
1999) when tested, or led to believe they would be tested, with a polygraph exam; suggesting 
that they were minimizing or withholding this information prior to the introduction (or threat) of 
the polygraph. Understandably, sex offenders are often motivated to misreport this information 
due to sentencing and release considerations, and their own personal safety in the correctional 
environment.  
In summary, response bias has hampered researchers ability to investigate various 
sexuality topics across both community and forensic settings. The next chapter will introduce a 
review of risky decision making, the role of mood in risky decision making, and provide a 
theoretical foundation for explaining why mood might be expected to influence response patterns 





CHAPTER 3:  RISKY DECISION MAKING: THE ROLE OF MOOD 
 
In the decision making literature, decision making is usually discussed in terms of 
certainty of the decision making process. In other words, decision making is categorized as being 
conducted under certain or uncertain conditions. Decision making under conditions of certainty 
suggests that the individual making the decision knows the potential outcome, and the 
probability of the outcome prior to making the decision. Therefore, making decisions under 
conditions of certainty essentially removes any potential risk, because there is no variability in 
the outcome.  However, the literature on decision making has largely focused on decision 
making under conditions of uncertainty, which is further divided into two subtypes:  
"ambiguous" and "risky" decision making. Ambiguous decision making refers to situations 
where the individual knows the possible outcome(s), but not the likelihood/probability of the 
outcome(s); In contrast, risky decision making refers to situations where the individual does not 
know what the potential outcomes will be (i.e., “risky” decisions) (Lauriola, Levin, & Hart, 
2007). However, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) offered a more parsimonious definition of risky 
decision making, such that risky decisions are those that involve more than one potential 
outcome, with the degree of risk increasing as the number of possible outcomes increases. For 
the purposes of this study, the latter definition of risky decision making will be adopted.    
The most prominent model used to predict risky decision making is Prospect Theory and 
its various iterations (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Essentially, 
Prospect Theory  suggests decision making consists of two stages, including the “framing” and 
“valuation” stages. In the framing stage, the individual sets up the choice situation by 
considering the possible actions, likelihoods, and outcomes related to the decision. In the 
valuation stage, the individual assesses the value of each choice option and selects an option to 
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maximize the value obtained (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). In its most basic form, Prospect 
Theory suggests that individuals will define the possible choices, their outcomes, the 
probabilities associated with these outcomes (i.e., framing stage); and the value of each of these 
potential outcomes (i.e., valuation stage) before making a decision. However, Prospect Theory 
(and other related theories) have been criticized for assuming decisions are made in a "cold" and 
rational way, and neglect the role of emotion/moods on the decision making process 
(Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003, p. 619). More recently, research on risky decision making has 
increasingly incorporated emotions/moods, and investigated how these influence probability 
estimation and valuation of outcomes during the decision making process.  
Definitions of Mood, Affect, and Emotion 
The terms mood, affect, and emotion are often used interchangeably in lay parlance; 
however, their definitions vary in the clinical and research literatures.  In the clinical literature, 
affect and mood are typically differentiated in terms of temporal duration and whether they are 
external/observable or internal/unobservable in nature (Serby, 2003).  More specifically, affect is 
described as transient and observable, while mood is described as longer lasting and 
unobservable (Serby, 2003).  However, these clinical definitions are primarily useful for 
descriptive purposes, and do not speak to the sources of, or functional differences between, affect 
and mood.   
In contrast to the clinical literature, the experimental literature tends to use the term affect 
as an umbrella term under which mood and emotion are subsumed (Forgas, 1994,1995), and it 
also focuses more on the sources of mood and emotion and their impact on subsequent behavior.  
Mood is often characterized as a “low-level affective state with no immediate antecedent cause,” 
(Forgas, 1991, p. 5).  In contrast, emotions are more highly specified and intense states that are 
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typically shorter in duration than moods (Clore & Tamir, 2002).  More importantly, emotions are 
generally elicited by and readily attributable to an external cause, while moods are not.  This 
distinction is important because it has different implications for an individual’s awareness of the 
influence of their affective state (either mood or emotion) on their behavior.  While emotion can 
influence behavior, the individual is typically aware that one’s emotional state is doing so (Clore 
& Tamir, 2002).  Ostensibly, the individual is able to modify one’s behavior accordingly in most 
cases.  Conversely, the individual is typically not aware of any particular reason for, or cause of, 
a given mood state.  According to the affect-as-information hypothesis (2002), mood—which 
may be unrelated to the decision making situation (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003, p. 620)—acts 
as more of a “background” affective state that can influence subsequent decision making and 
behavior without the individual being aware of its influence.  Given that an individual is always 
experiencing some type and degree of mood, it follows that mood is likely to influence decision 
making processes in all situations (Clore & Tamir, 2002), including in situations requiring self-
disclosure of sensitive information, such as sexual self-disclosure.  For the purposes of the 
current study, and consistent with the research literature, mood will be defined as a “lingering 
low-level affective state that is present after an emotional reaction to a stimulus, and as having an 
unrecognized influence on subsequent decision making.”   
  The Role of Mood in Risky Decision Making 
 To date, research in the area of mood and risky decision making has largely focused on 
how mood influences cognitive appraisals of probability and valuation (hereafter, it will be 
referred to as cost) of an expected outcome, and their subsequent impact on the decision making 
process. Research has generally found that positively and negatively valenced mood states have 
different effects on probability estimates of a negative outcome, and hence the decision making 
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process (Bless et al., 1990; Forgas, 1982; Isen & Means, 1983); however, these effects may be 
contingent upon the perceived cost of the outcome (Arkes, Herren, & Isen, 1988; Isen, Nygren, 
& Ashby, 1988; Isen & Patrick, 1983; Nygren, 1998; Nygren, Isen, Taylor, & Dulin, 1996). In 
other words, the effect of mood valence on risky decision making may be different depending on 
the how “costly” the potential negative outcome is perceived to be.  For example, research 
participants’ willingness to disclose “deviant” sexual fantasies and/or behavior may change 
according to their mood state and the perceived potential cost for doing so.  Therefore, in the 
following sections, research examining the role of positive and negative mood states under 
various cost or perceived cost conditions in risky decision making will be presented.  
The Role of Positive Mood in Risky Decision Making. Positive mood states, such as 
happiness, have been consistently found to influence judgment, including risk taking and related 
decision making strategies (Isen & Means, 1983; Isen & Patrick, 1983).  Researchers suggest 
that a positive mood state may engender feelings of safety and a perception that the environment 
is non-threatening (Forgas, 1982; Frijda, 1988; Nygren et al., 1996).  Accordingly, in risky 
situations, individuals in a positive mood state tend to perceive any potential negative outcomes 
as less likely than individuals in a neutral or negative mood state (Gasper & Clore, 1998).  
Moreover, according to the “mood maintenance” hypothesis (Clark & Isen, 1982; Isen & Patrick, 
1983), individuals in a positive mood state are motivated to preserve their positive mood and will 
engage in behavior that is consistent with this goal.  However, what this means in terms of risky 
decision making depends on the individual’s perception of the potential cost involved.  More 
specifically, the effect of positive mood on risky decision making has been found to differ 
depending on whether the decision maker perceives the cost as negligible (“low cost”) or highly 
aversive (“high cost”).   
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Low cost conditions.  Positive mood states may facilitate risky decision making under 
conditions of low cost, i.e., when the negative outcome is either imaginary or not particularly 
aversive (Arkes et al., 1988).  As previously noted, a positive mood state tends to lead to 
underestimation of the likelihood of a negative outcome.  Moreover, under low cost conditions, 
engaging in risky decision making and behavior does not pose a threat to the decision maker’s 
positive mood since the individual has nothing “real” to lose.  Therefore, given that cost 
considerations are not important in low cost risky situations, individuals in a positive mood state 
are more likely to use the lower probability estimates of the negative outcome in guiding their 
decision making (Arkes et al., 1988; Yuen & Lee, 2003).  Not surprisingly then, under low cost 
conditions, a positive mood state is associated with increased risky decision making (Yuen & 
Lee, 2003). 
In a seminal study conducted by Johnson and Tversky (1983), it was found that when 
participants were induced into a positive mood state, they made lower probability estimations for 
a variety of negative events. The participants had been asked to read a newspaper story regarding 
a particular tragedy, and when in a positive mood state, these same participants estimated a 
variety of negative events, even ones unlike the featured newspaper tragedy, as less likely to 
happen to them. The authors suggested that a positive mood state may facilitate a mindset where 
global estimates of risk are decreased irrespective of their relevance to the current situation.  In a 
similar study, Wright and Bower (1992) found that positive mood participants estimated a 
variety of negative events as less likely to happen to them than did negative mood or control 
participants.    
 Although these two studies provide information regarding probability estimations of 
possible negative life events, these studies did not examine actual decision making. In a study 
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that focused more specifically on decision making, a group of undergraduate participants 
induced into a positive mood state after watching a happy movie clip, were asked to make 
choices in a series of hypothetical “everyday” life dilemmas (Yuen & Lee, 2003).  The results 
demonstrated that participants in a positive mood state were more likely to make riskier 
decisions compared to participants in a neutral or negative mood state.  Similarly, Nygren (1998) 
also found that undergraduate participants induced into a positive mood state, by receiving a 
small gift and reading positive statements, were willing to make riskier gambles for hypothetical 
credit hours than were participants induced into a negative mood state.  
 It should be noted, however, that the preceding studies required participants to engage in 
risk estimation and risky decision making involving hypothetical situations.  For example, in 
Yuen & Lee’s (2003) and Nygren’s (1998) studies, participants were asked to make choices in 
hypothetical everyday dilemmas or make hypothetical risky gambles; hence, the participants had 
nothing tangible to lose for making riskier choices in these scenarios and the actual cost attached 
to the negative outcomes of their estimations/decisions was non-existent.  Therefore, individuals 
appear to be more likely to make riskier choices as long as the potential negative outcome or 
“loss” is negligible, or hypothetical in nature (i.e., low cost). 
In sum, individuals in a positive mood state not only underestimate the probability of a 
negative outcome, but in low cost scenarios, they also do not perceive the negative outcome as 
particularly aversive.  Therefore, engaging in risky decision making does not pose a threat to 
maintaining a positive mood state, and hence, risky decision making and behavior is more likely 
to result.  In terms of sexual self-disclosure, in situations where there is little cost attached to 
making such disclosures (i.e., responses are anonymous and confidential), an individual in a 
positive mood state should be more likely to disclose deviant sexual fantasies and/or behavior 
12 
 
than an individual in a neutral or negative mood state.  However, in risky situations when a high 
cost is attached to the negative outcome, then a positive mood state has been found to have an 
opposite effect on decision making (Arkes et al., 1988; Isen & Patrick, 1983; Isen et al., 1988; 
Nygren, 1998; Nygren et al., 1996).  
High cost conditions.  Generally, when individuals are in a positive mood state and 
perceive a potential negative outcome as meaningful or high in “cost,” they tend to demonstrate 
what is called “probability insensitivity” (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2007).  In 
other words, they tend to no longer use the lower probability estimates of the negative outcome 
in guiding their decision making; rather, perceived cost becomes the most salient consideration 
(Arkes et al., 1988; Nygren, 1998).  Essentially, individuals will switch from using a probability-
focused rule to a cost-focused rule in guiding their decision making.  In addition, a high cost is 
perceived as even more aversive in a positive mood state compared to a negative or neutral mood 
state (Isen et al., 1988).  A positive mood state provides a different reference point for evaluating 
the “costliness” of a negative outcome, such that it will be perceived as qualitatively more 
aversive than if it was evaluated during a neutral or negative mood state (Isen et al., 1988; 
Nygren, 1998). Moreover, as noted earlier, the mood maintenance hypothesis would suggest that 
individuals in a positive mood state would perceive a potential high cost in a risky situation as 
particularly aversive because it poses a threat to the maintenance of their positive mood state.  As 
a result, they would engage in behavior to protect their positive mood (Clark & Isen, 1982).  
Therefore, under high cost conditions, individuals in a positive mood state are likely to engage in 
more conservative decision making (Isen & Patrick, 1983; Arkes et al., 1988; Isen et al., 1988).  
A series of studies conducted by Isen and colleagues (Isen et al., 1988; Nygren, 1998; 
Nygren et al., 1996) examined the effect of mood state on risky decision making.  Positive mood 
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condition participants were induced into a positive mood by a small gift of candy or by reading a 
list of positive statements in addition to a gift of candy.  Positive mood participants exhibited 
what the authors called “cautious optimism” when engaging in high-stakes gambling tasks. More 
specifically, these individuals demonstrated more conservative gambling strategies when they 
ran the risk of losing a tangible prize in the form of blank video cassettes or research credit hours 
compared to individuals in a control condition (i.e., those who received no mood induction) or 
negative mood condition.  Positive mood participants exhibited a greater sensitivity to losses and 
made more conservative gambling choices than their control and negative mood counterparts.   
In summary, positive mood can have differential effects on risky decision making 
depending on the perceived cost of the potential negative outcome (Isen et al., 1988; Nygren et 
al., 1996). If the cost is perceived as negligible, then individuals in a positive mood state are 
more likely to focus on the low probability of a negative outcome, and hence, are more likely to 
engage in risky decision making than are individuals in a neutral or negative mood state.  
Conversely, if the cost is perceived as highly aversive, then individuals in a positive mood state 
are more likely to focus on the potential cost than the low probability of the negative outcome, 
and hence, be less likely to engage in risky decision making than individuals in a neutral or 
negative mood state.  In terms of sexual self-disclosure, under low cost conditions, positive 
mood participants should be more willing to disclose deviant sexual fantasies and/or behavior 
than when in neutral or negative mood state; but, under high cost conditions, positive mood 
participants should be less willing to disclose such fantasies/behaviors than when in a neutral or 
negative mood state.   
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Negative mood states also influence risky decision making, albeit in different ways than 
positive mood.  The next section reviews research examining negative mood states and risky 
decision making under both low and high cost conditions. 
The Role of Negative Mood in Risky Decision Making. A review of the mood and 
risky decision making literature indicates that negative mood states, such as sadness, have not 
received comparable research attention as positive mood states, such as happiness.  Nonetheless, 
it is generally agreed that individuals in a negative mood tend to overestimate the probability of a 
negative outcome (Gasper & Clore, 1998; Johnson & Tversky, 1983) while concurrently 
underestimating the probability of a positive outcome (Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Mayer, 
Gaschke, Braverman, & Evans, 1992; Wright & Bower, 1992).  Moreover, according to the 
“mood-repair hypothesis”, individuals in a negative mood are motivated to bolster their mood 
and will engage in behavior consistent with this goal (Isen & Geva, 1987).  However, what this 
means in terms of risky decision making depends on the individual’s perception of the potential 
cost involved.  
 Low cost conditions.  The mood-repair hypothesis would suggest that individuals in a 
negative mood state are motivated to “feel better” (Isen & Geva, 1987).  Hence, individuals in a 
negative mood state may engage in risky decision making when there is a potential pay-off, since 
the material reward is likely to elevate their mood.  However, under low cost conditions where 
there is little to no material reward, they have nothing to gain, particularly in terms of mood, by 
engaging in risky decision making.  As noted previously, individuals in a negative mood state 
tend to overestimate the likelihood of a negative outcome (Gasper & Clore, 1998; Johnson & 
Tversky, 1983).  Accordingly, under low cost conditions, individuals in a negative mood state 
should engage in more conservative risky decision making since they overestimate the likelihood 
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of a negative outcome (even if it is negligible), and they have nothing to gain by engaging in 
risky decision making.   
However, the limited research examining the effect of negative mood on risky decision 
making under low cost conditions has provided inconsistent findings.  The first studies in this 
area, discussed earlier, examined the effect of mood state on probability estimations of possible 
negative life events (Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Wright & Bower, 1992).  Johnson and Tversky 
(1983) found that undergraduate participants induced into a negative mood state (by reading 
about a fatality) were subsequently more likely to display a global increase in risk perception for 
a variety of fatalities, regardless of whether it was similar to the one depicted in the mood 
induction scenario.  Similarly, Wright and Bower (1992) found that undergraduate participants 
induced into a negative mood state, via sad autobiographical recollections, perceived a range of 
negative life experiences as more likely to happen to them than did positive mood participants.   
In another study presented earlier, Yuen and Lee (2003) examined the relationship 
between mood state and choice behavior in hypothetical “everyday” dilemmas.  Participants 
induced into a negative mood state via depressing movie clips were subsequently more likely to 
make more conservative choices when deciding what to do in hypothetical, everyday life 
“dilemmas”, than were participants induced into a neutral or positive mood state. The authors 
suggested that a negative mood state likely led these participants’ to perceive the world as a more 
threatening place, causing them to attempt to reduce losses in the hypothetical, yet risky, 
situations posed to them.  Similarly, Nygren (1998) found that negative mood participants were 
less likely to gamble hypothetical credit hours than were positive mood participants.  The results 
of these two studies would suggest that under low cost conditions, negative mood states foster 
more conservative risky decision making.  
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In a series of three experiments examining the effect of mood on risky decision making in 
hypothetical scenarios (i.e., under lost cost conditions), Raghunathan and Pham (1999) found 
contrasting results to those of Yuen and Lee (2003) and Nygren (1998). In the first two 
experiments, the researchers found that undergraduate participants induced into a sad mood by 
reading a depressing vignette engaged in riskier decision making on both hypothetical gambling 
and mock job selection tasks than anxious or neutral mood peers.  In the third experiment, 
participants were asked to make gambling choices for both themselves and others, and found that 
the mood effects observed in the first two experiments persisted only when the participants were 
making gambling choices for themselves.   
Although theory would predict that under low cost conditions, negative mood states 
should facilitate more risk-averse decision making, research findings suggest negative mood 
states may lead to either risk-averse or risk-prone decision making.  These disparities are not 
easily reconciled, at least upon review of the literature, and more research will likely need to be 
conducted in order to clarify these issues. Despite the inconsistent results, these studies can be 
arguably subsumed under the category of low-cost given that they all involved either risk 
estimation (with no actual self-relevant decision making required) or risky decision making in 
hypothetical, and low cost situations. The next section will focus on the impact of negative mood 
on risky decision making under high cost conditions.  
 High cost conditions.  There is a paucity of experimental research examining the effect 
of negative mood on risky decision making in high-cost situations, but the limited and relevant 
literature overlaps considerably with behavoiural economics. The literature that does exist is 
largely focused on managerial or organizational-level decision making that is not necessarily 
self-relevant for the decision maker in question (e.g., Kliger & Levy, 2002; Mittal & Ross, 
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1998); the results may not be generalizable to self-relevant risky decision making as discussed in 
this paper.  Nonetheless, the mood repair hypothesis (Isen & Geva, 1987) would suggest that 
individuals in a negative mood state are impelled to alleviate the unpleasantness of a negative 
mood state by engaging in some reparative action (Caruso & Shafir, 2006). Thus, individuals in a 
negative mood state are more likely to engage in risky decision making if the potential payoff is 
perceived to be desirable, and hence, will elevate their mood (Caruso & Shafir, 2006).  Research 
findings have generally supported this idea.  In a study mentioned previously, Nygren (1998) 
found that participants induced into a positive mood state by receipt of a small gift of candy and 
reading positive statements, were more conservative when gambling for tangible rewards in the 
form of blank video cassettes or credit hours.  Stated another way, negative mood participants 
were more risky in their decision making compared to their positive mood peers.   
 Indeed, clinical literature has noted that individuals in negative mood states often engage 
in what would seem to be “self-defeating” or “self-destructive” behavior (Leith & Baumeister, 
1996), such as gambling (Peck, 1986) or abusing alcohol (Golding, Burnam, Benjamin, & Wells, 
1992), in an attempt to “feel good.”  Ostensibly, individuals in a negative mood state are 
motivated to engage in these risky decisions and behaviors, despite the potential high costs 
involved, because of the potential “feel good” (hedonic) rewards and temporary elevation in 
mood resulting from these activities.    
 In summary, under high cost conditions wherein a potential pay-off is possible, 
individuals in a negative mood are more likely to engage in riskier decision making and 
behavior.  The mood repair hypothesis suggests this is motivated by the individual’s attempt to 
decrease the aversiveness of a negative mood state through the positive hedonic effects of the 
18 
 
potential pay-off; an assertion generally supported by the limited experimental and clinical 
research in this area.   
Although no studies have to date have explored the influence of mood and cost 
perception on disclosure of deviant sexual fantasies and behavior, two studies has examined the 
affect of mood on non-sexual self-disclosure. 
Mood and “Risky” Non-Sexual Self-Disclosure 
There is little research examining the effect of mood on self-disclosure of sensitive 
information, such as disclosure of sexual fantasies and behaviors.  One exception is a study that 
investigated the effect of mood state on disclosure of personal information in an interview 
context with an opposite-sex peer.  In this study, Cunningham (1988) found that participants 
induced to a positive mood state were more likely to make “medium” and “high” intimacy 
disclosures related to personal and social information, such as hobbies and religious interests, to 
an opposite-sex peer than were participants induced to a negative mood state. However, there 
were no between mood condition differences for “low” intimacy disclosures. Therefore, this 
would suggest participants were more willing to make “riskier” personal disclosures to an 
opposite-sex peer when in a positive mood state than when in a negative mood state 
(Cunningham, 1988).  
Similarly, in a series of studies conducted by Forgas (2011), it was found that participants 
induced to a positive (happy) mood state were more likely to disclose a greater depth and breadth 
of intimate information (e.g., financial, body, health) in response to a hypothetical and computer-
mediated interaction with a peer than were participants induced to a negative mood state.  
However, disclosures in Cunningham’s (1988) and Forgas' (2011) studies were made in 
the context of face-to-face, computer-mediated, or imagined dyadic interactions with a peer and 
19 
 
not on a research survey, introducing interpersonal dynamics that are not present when 
disclosures are made on a survey.  More importantly, the “risky” disclosures in the both studies 
appear to be relatively benign compared to the sexual self-disclosures required in the present 
study (e.g., pedophilic fantasy) and may not have been perceived as “costly.”  Therefore, it is 
unknown whether his findings of mood effects on risky disclosures will extend to the disclosure 
of deviant sexual fantasies and behavior in the current study.  Disclosing deviant sexual fantasies 
and/or behavior is potentially more stigmatizing than making disclosures about hobbies, religious 
interests, or finances.  In fact, research has demonstrated that sexual fantasies and behavior are 
one type of information that is particularly likely to be underreported, or not reported at all, due 
to the nature of the subject matter (Catania, McDermott, & Pollack, 1986; Catania et al., 1990). 
Sexual Self-Disclosure as Risky Decision Making 
 Making the decision to disclose personal information of a sexual nature is a potentially 
costly venture, since making such disclosures puts one at risk of negative social judgment and 
stigmatization by others (Catania et al., 1990).  Research has shown that individuals are least 
likely to disclose information that is perceived to be socially unacceptable (Pennebaker, 1989), 
transgressive (Pasupathi, McLean, & Weeks, 2009), or socially deviant (Catania et al., 1986) for 
fear of social disapproval or rejection (Catania et al., 1990; Vrij, Nunkoosing, Paterson, 
Ooosterwegel, & Soukara, 2002).  Research has found the material most likely to be 
underreported or non-disclosed is that relating to abortion, substance use, sexual and domestic 
abuse, delinquent behavior, and sexual fantasies and behavior, due to the potentially 
stigmatizing nature of the material (Fendrich & Vaughn, 1995; Kelly & McKillop, 1996; 
Sandberg, Rotheram-Borus, Bradlery, & Martin, 1988; Smith, Adler, & Tschann, 1999).  With 
20 
 
respect to sexual fantasies and behavior, those perceived as deviant, are most likely to be 
underreported or not reported at all (Catania et al., 1986; Catania et al., 1990).  
 A sexual fantasy is generally considered to become deviant when it contains content that 
is "marked by a significant departure from the behavioural norms of society" (Langevin, Lang, & 
Curnoe, 1998). In other words, this would include any fantasy that incorporates socially 
inappropriate, nonconsensual, and/or illegal sexual content (Maniglio, 2011). It is important to 
note that this definition does not include statistical deviance, since many sexual fantasies may 
occur relatively frequently in the general population, but would still be considered "normatively" 
deviant. 
It stands to reason then, that disclosure of deviant sexual fantasies and behaviors may 
lead to adverse social repercussions, and therefore, can be considered a type of risky decision 
making. If one chooses to disclose a deviant sexual fantasy and/or behavior, one runs the risk of 
social rejection or disapproval.  In a research setting, where participants are assured of 
confidentiality and anonymity, the perceived cost for making such disclosures is likely 
attenuated or negated (Meston et al., 1998).  However, if the conditions of reporting are 
conducted in an interpersonal context (such as an interview), or may have been initially reported 
in an anonymous fashion but later require in-person follow-up, the perceived cost may be high. 
As such, the “cost” in making disclosures of deviant sexual fantasies and/or behavior is likely 
contingent upon the conditions under which they are made.  Additional factors, other than mood 
and cost perception, have also been found to influence sexual self-disclosure, such as ethnicity, 
gender, and personality traits.     
Moderators of Sexual Self-Disclosure 
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 Research has shown that a variety of demographic and personality variables can influence 
sexual self disclosure, with some variables exerting more influence than others. 
 Ethnicity.  Little research has been conducted on the moderating effect of ethnicity on 
sexual self-disclosure (Catania et al., 1996). Nonetheless, at least in interview contexts, Hispanic 
men appear to be less willing to disclose sexual behavior in general (Catania et al., 1990) but 
more willing to overreport certain sexual behaviors, than men of other ethnic groups (Catania et 
al., 1990).  In addition, Black men were more willing to disclose non-condom use in an interview 
than were White men when the question was worded in a supportive way (Catania, 1999).  
Gender.  In general, men tend to disclose less than women (Dindia & Allen, 1992). 
However, when it comes to sexual self-disclosure, men may be more likely to disclose 
information related to genital-focused questions than women, whereas women may be more self-
disclosive when answering relationship-related questions. Durant, Carey, and Schroder (2002) 
found that in a sample of undergraduates, female participants were more likely to “prefer to not 
respond” to questions inquiring about sensitive behaviors (such as substance use, sex, and illegal 
behavior) on an anonymous survey, or to terminate the survey earlier than male participants.  
Personality.  The role of personality factors in self-disclosure has been debated in the 
literature and findings have been generally inconsistent (Omarzu, 2000). Although Big-Five 
personality constructs, such as extraversion, agreeableness, and openness, have been found to be 
related to self-disclosure in general and sexual self-disclosure more specifically (e.g., Stokes, 
1987), Meston and colleagues (1998) found that impression management was more important in 
accounting for sexual self-disclosure than were personality dimensions. Nonetheless, one 
personality construct that has been found to reliably predict sexual self-disclosure is erotophilia. 
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Erotophilia.   Erotophilia is a personality construct that reflects a comfort with sexually 
themed topics and material (Catania et al., 1986; Durant et al., 2002).  Not surprisingly, 
individuals who endorse a higher comfort level with various sexual topics, i.e., endorse higher 
levels of erotophilia, have been found to be more sexually self-disclosive (Catania et al., 1986; 
Durant et al., 2002).  
 Trait emotion.  Trait emotion refers to the degree to which an individual is inclined to 
experience the corresponding emotional state or mood.  For example, if an individual is 
frequently prone to experiencing states of sadness, he or she would be described as high in trait 
sadness or depression.  It has been suggested that individuals high on a trait emotion are more 
susceptible to the effects of the corresponding emotional state on their decision making.  An 
individual high on trait depression is likely to already possess a pessimistic worldview, which 
would only be enhanced when a negative mood state is experienced (Butler & Mathews, 1983; 
Lerner & Keltner, 2000).  Moreover, Damasio (as cited in Gasper & Clore, 1998) suggested that 
individuals high on a trait emotion may not have their decision making influenced by an 
opposite-state mood because it is inconsistent with how they typically feel.  For example, an 
individual who feels happy much of the time (i.e., high on trait happiness) may not have his or 
her decision making influenced by a sad mood state to the same degree that an individual high on 
trait depression would, since it as at odds with how they typically feel and therefore, make 
decisions.   
Accordingly, trait emotion or chronic mood disturbance, such as a mood disorder, could 
serve as a potentially confounding variable to the “pure” effect of a temporary mood state on 
risky decision making.  In the case of sexual self-disclosure, trait emotion may influence the 
degree to which a participant experiences mood-specific effects on their decision to disclose and 
23 
 
how much to disclose.  For example, individuals high on trait depression may experience 
compounded negative mood state effects on sexual self-disclosure, compared to individuals low 
in trait depression and in a negative mood state. 
Summary   
The influence of mood on self-disclosure of deviant sexual fantasies and behavior may 
depend on a complex interplay between mood valence and perception of cost.  Under low cost 
conditions, such as when responses are confidential and anonymous, individuals in a positive 
mood state may be more disclosive than individuals in a neutral or negative mood state.  Under 
high cost conditions, such as when confidentiality and anonymity are not assured, individuals in 
a positive mood state may be less disclosive than individuals in a neutral or negative mood state.  
After a review of the relevant literature, it remains unclear how a negative mood state will 
influence self-disclosure patterns of deviant sexual fantasies and behavior, regardless of 
perceived cost, since individuals have nothing to gain by making such disclosures.  Additional 
factors such as gender, ethnicity, and personality traits, may also influence disclosure of deviant 
sexual fantasies and behavior. 
 
Study Hypotheses 
The present study examined the differential effect of mood on rates of self-disclosure of 
deviant sexual fantasies and behavior, as a function of the perceived cost of making such 
disclosures.  Three primary hypotheses are forwarded for each of the two cost conditions.   
It is predicted that under low cost conditions: 
1. a greater number of participants will endorse experiencing any deviant sexual 
fantasies/behaviors when in a positive mood condition than when in neutral or 
negative mood conditions. 
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2. of the subgroup of individuals who endorse the presence of any deviant sexual 
fantasies, those in the positive mood condition will report a greater number of 
deviant sexual fantasies/behaviors (i.e., will endorse a higher number of fantasies 
as “present” than “absent”) than those in the neutral or negative mood conditions.  
3. of the subgroup of individuals who endorse the presence of any deviant sexual 
fantasies/behaviors, those in the positive mood condition will disclose higher total 
mean frequency rates of deviant sexual fantasies and behaviors than those in the 
neutral or negative mood conditions. 
It is also predicted that under high cost conditions: 
4. a lower number of participants will endorse experiencing any deviant sexual 
fantasies/beheviors when in a positive mood condition than when in neutral or 
negative mood conditions. 
5. of the subgroup of participants who endorse the presence of any deviant sexual 
fantasies, those in the positive mood condition will report a lower number of 
deviant sexual fantasies and behaviors (i.e., will endorse a lower number as 
“present” than “absent”) than those in the neutral or negative mood conditions. 
6. of the subgroup of participants who endorse the presence of any deviant sexual 
fantasies/behaviors, those in the positive mood condition will disclose lower total 
mean frequency rates of deviant sexual fantasies and behaviors than those in the 
neutral or negative mood conditions.   
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CHAPTER 4: METHOD 
 
Participants 
Eligibility criteria. All participants were required to be of adult age (i.e., over 18 years 
old) and have access to the internet in order to complete the online survey. Community 
participants (i.e., those taking part in the full study) were also required to have a PayPal account 
(an encrypted online payment service) and a debit/credit card in order receive compensation 
($12.50) for their participation.  
Phase 1 (Pilot Phase).  The pilot sample was recruited to test the efficacy of the mood 
induction and cost perception manipulation stimuli; this sample was recruited through an 
Introductory Psychology course and participants were awarded one course credit for completion 
of the survey.In total, 81 undergraduate students (X age = 19.19; SD = 1.42; n = 79) were 
recruited. This sample was composed of 63.3% females and 36.7% males (all cisgender for both 
genders). In terms of ethnic composition, 16.5% identified as White, 13.9% as Black, 50.6% as 
Latino, 13.9% as Asian/Pacific Islander, and 5.1% as "Other." Finally, with respect to sexual 
orientation, 86.5% identified as "Heterosexual," 3.8% as "Bisexual," 5.8% as "Homosexual" and 
3.8% as "Unsure." Note, the sexual orientation item was subsequently modified to include two 
additional anchor points ("Mostly heterosexual" and "Mostly homosexual") for Phase 2 of the 
study in order to better reflect a continuum of sexuality.  
Phase 2.  The study design is a 3 (mood: happy vs. neutral vs. sad) X 2 (cost perception: 
Low vs. High) factorial design.  A power analysis conducted using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, 
Buchner, & Lang, 2009) indicated that in order to achieve a power of approximately .90 and a 
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moderate effect size of .20, a sample size of 420 participants (74 per condition) would be 
required.   
In total, 338 community adult (X age = 32.10; SD = 12.24) community participants were 
recruited. Data for seven individuals were removed because they failed to answer any items on 
the survey, leaving a total sample of 331. This sample was composed of 59.3% females (194 
cisgender, 1 transgender) and 40.7% males (all cisgender). In terms of ethnic composition, 
42.4% identified as White, 24.8% as Black, 14.5% as Latino, 10.9% as Asian/Pacific Islander, 
and 7.3% as "Other." Finally, with respect to sexual orientation, 72.8% identified as "Completely 
heterosexual," 14.2% as "Mostly heterosexual," 6.3% as "Bisexual," 1.5% as "Mostly 
homosexual," 4.2% as "Completely homosexual," and none endorsed "Not sure."  
Procedure 
 Undergraduate participants learned of the study through an established research 
experience program (REP) that is offered as an option for course credit.  The REP website 
provided a study description  and a contact email address. Students interested in the study were 
prompted  to email the researcher directly to enroll.  Community participants  were also advised  
to contact the researcher directly if interested in research participation; however in an effort to 
reduce self-selection bias, the advertisements did not disclose the nature of the study. After 
community participants made the initial email inquiry about the study, they were provided with a 
description of the study. In this way, drop-out based on the nature of the study, could be 
monitored. Only two  participants declined to participate in the study when informed of the 
sexual nature of the survey; an additional two  participants declined/were unable to participate 
because they did not feel comfortable providing a debit/credit card information to a third-party 
website (i.e., PayPal)/did not have a debit/credit card.   
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After contacting the researcher by email, each participant (whether undergraduate or 
community) was randomly assigned to one of the six conditions.  Each participant was provided 
a unique, randomly-generated 5-digit ID number and the weblink unique to their respective 
condition. Each of the six weblinks (one per condition) contained identical online versions of the 
questionnaire battery, except for differences in mood manipulation and cost perception stimuli.  
In other words, participants filled out the same questionnaires, but were presented with a 
different version of the consent form (for manipulation of cost perception) and a different mood 
induction stimulus depending on their cell assignment.  
Survey Completion. Once participants clicked on the weblink provided to them by the 
researcher, they were redirected to the survey. Online data collection was conducted through a 
reputable survey data collection website, SurveyMonkey.com, to ensure security and anonymity. 
Participants were prompted to enter their unique 5-digit participant number at the beginning of 
the survey.   
At the end of the survey, participants read a debriefing page that explained the purpose of 
the study and thanked them for their participation.  Participants were then asked to contact the 
researcher again via email with their participant ID number for payment.  Undergraduate 
participants were then granted one course credit for their participation through the REP website. 
Community participants were sent a response email including a link to PayPal, a secure and 
confidential online payment site.  Community participants clicked on the PayPal link and were 
credited $12.50 to their debit/credit card through the PayPal system; they also received a 
confirmation email from the researcher and PayPal indicating their payment had been processed. 
It should be noted that all of the cost and mood manipulation stimuli and questionnaire 
measures were presented in a fixed sequence given that mood manipulations are time sensitive. 
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Although it is often recommended that questionnaires be counterbalanced in order to control for 
order effects, it was determined that presenting the variables of critical interest in a 
counterbalanced sequence could possibly attenuate the effect of the mood manipulation given 
that mood changes over time.  Therefore, cost and mood manipulation stimuli and questionnaires 
were presented in a fixed sequence.  
Independent Variables and Manipulation Checks.  After entering their ID number, 
participants were presented with one of the two following versions of the consent form 
depending on which cost perception condition they had been assigned: 
Perception of Low Cost. Participants were presented with a standard consent form with 
assurances that all responses will be entirely anonymous and confidential. In this way, 
considerations of cost for disclosing deviant sexual fantasies and/or behavior were ostensibly 
negated.  Once participants read the consent form, they clicked on a radio button to indicate their 
consent or non-consent to proceed.  Manipulation check:  Participants completed a three-
question true/false quiz to ensure they attended to and understood the content of the consent 
form, including: their responses were completely confidential and anonymous, their data was 
identified by their ID number only, and only members of the research team would have access to 
their data (See Appendix A).     
Perception of High Cost. Participants were presented with the same consent form as in 
the Low Cost condition.  However, they were also instructed that although answers will be kept 
strictly confidential, they may be “randomly selected” to come in at a later date to conduct a 
follow-up interview about their responses with a member of the research team. In addition, the 
consent form advised them that because the selection process is random, selection for follow-up 
is not contingent upon their responses. As such, they were told they will be asked to provide an 
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email address for contact purposes at the end of the survey if selected for follow-up; however, no 
participant was actually asked to provide an email address at the end of the survey and no 
follow-up interviews were conducted.  These instructions were intended to increase the salience 
of cost considerations (i.e., possible social stigmatization or judgment by the research 
interviewer if they are selected), and allowed us to collect data on participant drop-out rates after 
reading the instructions.  Once participants read the consent form, they clicked on a radio button 
to indicate their consent or non-consent to proceed. Manipulation check:  Participants completed 
a three-question true/false quiz to ensure they understood that:  they may be selected at random 
for an in-person follow-up interview with a member of the research team; the selection process 
was done by lottery; and if selected, they would be asked to provide an email address at the end 
of the survey (See Appendix B).  
After reading the appropriate version of the consent form and completing the short three-
question quiz (the cost perception manipulation check), participants were then asked to fill out 
three demographic questions (gender, ethnicity, and age).  It was felt that including these few 
demographic questions after the cost manipulation would allow us to, at the least, have basic 
demographic data if participants subsequently dropped out before completion.  The remaining 
demographic questions that were less central to the hypotheses were placed at the end of the 
survey and include marital/relationship status, year in college, first language, and years living in 
the United States. The final questionnaire also asked about psychiatric history, abuse history, and 
legal history. Initially, individuals who reported a current diagnosis of a mood disorder were 
going to be excluded from data analysis given that current or chronic mood disturbance may 
confound the effects of a temporary mood induction; however, there data was retained after 
finding that their inclusion did not significantly alter the results.   
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Mood Induction Protocol. Following completion of the first three demographic 
questions, participants were presented with a mood induction stimulus unique to their assigned 
mood condition.  The mood induction stimuli are similar to those used in previous studies (e.g., 
Forgas, 2011; Wright & Bower, 1992) and are as follows: 
Neutral (Control) Mood. Those in the neutral (or control) condition were asked to list a 
chronological record of activities for a typical weekday, providing as much detail as possible 
(e.g., what time do you usually get up, what do you usually do to get ready in the morning, etc.). 
Note, a "typical" day was asked about instead of a recent day during the past week, because the 
former was believed to be less likely to be associated with a potential "bad" or "good" day, 
which could inadvertently induce its own mood, confounding the neutral mood manipulation. 
Manipulation check:  Participants were also asked to rate how they currently feel according to 
three unipolar affective rating scales: happiness, sadness, and relaxed; ranging from 1 (“Not at all 
happy/sad/relaxed”) to 10 (“Extremely happy/sad/relaxed”) (See Appendix C). 
Positive (Happy) Mood. Participants in the positive mood condition were asked to recall 
their happiest memory, and asked to write down a detailed narrative of it, with particular 
attention to what about the event made them happy.  Participants were also asked to rate how 
happy this memory made them at the time that the event took place along a 10-point scale (1 = 
“not at all happy”, 10 = “Extremely happy”).  Manipulation check:  Participants also rated how 
they currently felt according to the same three unipolar affective rating scales: happiness, 
sadness, relaxed; ranging from 1 (“Not at all happy/sad/relaxed”) to 10 (“Extremely 
happy/sad/relaxed”) (See Appendix D). 
Negative (Sad) Mood. Participants in the negative mood condition were asked to recall 
their saddest memory, and asked to write down a detailed narrative of it, with particular attention 
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to what about the event mad them sad.  Participants were also asked to rate how sad this memory 
made them at the time that the event took place along a 10-point scale (1 = “Not at all sad”, 10 = 
“Extremely sad”).  Manipulation check:  Participants also rated how they currently felt according 
to the same three unipolar affective rating scales: happiness, sadness, relaxed; ranging from 1 
(“Not at all happy/sad/relaxed”) to 10 (“Extremely happy/sad/relaxed”) (See Appendix E). 
Measures 
Following the mood induction stimulus, participants completed questionnaires  in the 
listed sequence, which were estimated to take between 55-75 minutes to complete. 
Dependent Variables.   
Sexual Fantasy Questionnaire (SFQ; Gray, Watt, Hassan, & MacCulloch, 2003). The 
SFQ is a 279-item questionnaire that asks participants to rate the frequency of 93 sexual 
fantasies, and the frequency with which they have engaged in the corresponding sexual behavior, 
and the pleasure they derive from it, if applicable.  Fantasy, behaviors and the pleasure derived 
from engaging in the behaviors, are all rated along a 4-point numerically anchored scale; 
however, the anchor labels vary.  Fantasy item anchors are labeled as follows: 0 = “No sexual 
interest”, 1 = “Slight sexual interest”, 2 = “Have fantasized about frequently”, and 3 = “Cannot 
get it out of my mind.”  Behavior item anchors are labeled as: 0 = “Never done”, 1 = “Have done 
once or twice”, 2 = “Have done several times”, and 3 = “Have done many times.”  Pleasure items 
are labeled as:  0 = “Didn’t enjoy”, 1 = “Enjoyed slightly”, 2 = “Enjoyed moderately”, and 3 = 
“Enjoyed greatly.”  
For the purposes of the current study, several modifications were made to the SFQ.  First, 
some fantasy items and their corresponding behavior items were removed because of vague 
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language.  For example, one item read “Romantic sexual contact with somebody you know,” 
which does not specify an act nor a relationship with the “somebody.”  Additional fantasy items, 
and their behaviors, were removed due to lack of endorsement in our previous research (Maile, 
Maile, & Allwood, 2009).  For example, no previous participants endorsed fantasizing about 
“Body piercing” or having “Sex with somebody you don’t like.”  Other single fantasy and 
behavior items were bifurcated to specify whether the fantasy involved the act with a sexual 
partner or a stranger.  Finally, some items were reworded to improve readability for our target 
participants.  For example, the word “whilst” was changed to “while”, and “sex in toilets with 
strangers” was changed to “sex in bathrooms with strangers.” In addition, the pleasure items 
were removed and replaced with more behaviorally based masturbation items.  Therefore, 
participants rated both the frequency with which they experience and masturbate to fantasies (the 
latter of which will now be referred to as masturbatory fantasies), and the frequency with which 
they engage in the corresponding behavior.  In total, the modified SFQ used in the present study 
was comprised of 252 items across three domains:  84 fantasy items, 84 masturbatory fantasy 
items, and 84 behavior items.   
Rating scales were changed from 4-point to 5-point scales to provide a wider range of 
values and increase sensitivity.  In addition, a “Prefer to Not Respond” option was added to all 
items.  Also, the wording of the anchor labels was modified to increase consistency across the 
scales.  The revised fantasy item anchors are:  0 = “Have never fantasized about”, 1 = “Have 
fantasized about once or twice”, 2 = “Have fantasized about several times”, 3 = “Have fantasized 
about frequently”, 4 = “Have fantasized about very frequently.”  The masturbation item anchors 
are:  0 = “Never masturbated”, 1 = “Have masturbated about once or twice”, 2 = “Have 
masturbated about several times”, 3 = “Have masturbated about frequently”, 4 = “Have 
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masturbated about very frequently.”  The revised behavior items are:  0 = “Have never done”, 1 
= “Have done once or twice”, 2 = “Have done several times”, 3 = “Have done frequently”, 4 = 
“Have done very frequently” (See Appendix F). No data were published by the original authors 
regarding the SFQ’s test-retest reliability or internal consistency, nor was data provided 
regarding the factor structure of the scale. For the current sample, a cronbach’s alpha value of .98 
was obtained for the overall scale; and.96, .97, and .94 for the subscales of sexual fantasies, 
masturbatory fantasies, and behaviours, respectively. Internal consistency values of this degree 
are considered “excellent” (George & Mallery, 2003).   
Covariates. 
Sexual Opinion Survey (SOS; Fisher, Byrne, White, & Kelley, 1988). The SOS is a 21-
item measure assessing an individual’s attitude toward sexuality along a negative-positive 
continuum (see Appendix G).  This construct has also been called “erotophilia-erotophobia” in 
previous studies.  Participants are asked to rate the sexual statements on a 7-point Likert scale (1 
= Strongly Disagree to 7= Strongly Agree).  Total scores can then be calculated, with higher 
scores reflecting greater discomfort with sexual themed material and topics (i.e., greater 
erotophobia).  Previous studies have noted alpha coefficients ranging from .80 to .90, and test-
retest reliability of .80. For the current study, an alpha coefficient of .87 was obtained, suggesting 
“good” internal consistency (George & Mallery, 2003).  
Oxford Happiness Inventory (OHI; Argyle, Martin, & Crossland, 1989).  The OHI is a 
29-item self-report measure that assesses trait happiness (see Appendix H).  Items are rated along 
a 7-point Likert scale with values ranging from “1” (Disagree) to “7” (Agree). Items scores are 
summed for a total score, with higher scores reflecting greater trait happiness.  Previous studies 
have noted alpha coefficients ranging from .64-.87, and a test-retest reliability of .78.  For the 
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current study, an alpha coefficient of .93 was obtained, suggesting an “excellent” internal 
consistency (George & Mallery, 2003). 
 State-Trait Depression Scales, Trait Subscale (T-DEP; Spielberger, Carretero-Dios, 
De los Santos-Roig, & Buela-Casal, 2002).  This subscale of the T-DEP consists of 10 self-
report items tapping trait depression (see Appendix I).  Responses are rated along a 4-point 
Likert scale, with values ranging from 1 ("Almost Never") to 4 ("Almost Always") and higher 
scores indicating greater trait depression.  In its initial psychometric validation, this subscale 
evidenced a high internal consistency of .90, and an eight-week test-retest reliability of .78. For 
the current study, an alpha coefficient of .91 was obtained, suggesting “excellent” internal 
consistency (George & Mallery, 2003). 
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale, Short Form C Version (M-C Form C; 
Reynolds, 1982):  The M-C Form C version is a condensed 13-item version of the original 33-
item questionnaire (see Appendix J).  It is a self-report questionnaire that measures the extent to 
which the participant’s response tendency is to “fake good.”  The participant responds “true” or 
“false” to the 13 items to yield a total score, with higher scores reflecting a tendency to “fake 
good.”  Reynolds (1982) reported acceptable reliability with a Kuder-Richardson 20 estimate of 
.76.  For the current study, an alpha coefficient of .60 was obtained, suggesting “questionable” 





CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
 
 The following subsections detail how potential sources of data bias (i.e., outliers) were 
identified and addressed, and discuss data analyses, including: testing if the experimental 
manipulations (i.e., mood induction and cost perception) worked; the process for identifying 
covariates to be included in analyses; and testing of the study's hypotheses.  All data analyses 
were conducted using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences Version 19 (SPSS v. 19.0). 
Data Analysis 
It should be noted that the use of analyses of variance (ANOVA) and covariance 
(ANCOVA), both parametric tests, typically require the use of interval scale data in order to 
satisfy model assumptions of normality. The scale of measurement for the outcome variables in 
the present study is not truly interval, but ordinal. Although the numerical rating scale is 
interval—rated 0 to 4—the underlying metric is not. For example, the interval difference 
between a rating of 1 (“once or twice”) and 2 (“several times”) is not equal to the difference 
between a rating of 2 (“several times”) and 3 (“frequently”).   There is some controversy over the 
appropriate statistical procedure to use in this case, with some researchers suggesting a  
preference for non-parametric tests (e.g., Mann-Whitney U test), while others defend the use of 
more traditional parametric tests, such as analyses of variance (ANOVA) and covariance 
(ANCOVA). Recent research suggests that analyses of variance and covariance are robust when 
the outcome of interest employs a three-, four-, or five-level ordinal scale, which the current 
study does, even with very small sample sizes (Sullivan & D’Agostino, 2003). Therefore, two-
way ANCOVAs were deemed appropriate.  
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Prior to conducting two-way analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) to test hypotheses 
certain model assumptions for each of the ANCOVAs were examined, including normality, and 
independence of the independent (treatment) variables and the covariates. Both assumptions 
were satisfied for all models. Additional assumptions were tested as part of the statistical 
analyses (i.e., homogeneity of variance and homogeneity of regression slopes for each of the 
models), and again, these assumptions were satisfied unless specifically noted. A Sidak 
correction was used for post-hoc testing for all ANCOVAs to control for family-wise error. A 
Bonferroni correction is traditionally used to reduce alpha inflation introduced by multiple post-
hoc tests; however, in cases where power is of concern, a more liberal Sidak correction is 
recommended (Field, 2013, p. 491). The results of the ANCOVAs are reported below, including 
adjusted means and means, and effect sizes. Note, traditionally effect sizes are interpreted as 
"small" when close to a value of .20, "medium" when close to a value of .50, and "large" when 
close to a value of .80 (Field, 2011, p. 80).  
Non-parametric chi-square tests were used to test certain hypotheses (i.e., comparing 
number of individuals reporting any deviant sexual fantasies, masturbatory fantasies, and 
behvaiours) and are detailed below.   
 Data bias.   
Outliers. Boxplots were constructed for each of the six outcome variables (i.e., number 
and frequency of deviant sexual fantasies, masturbatory fantasies, and behaviors) and were 
visually inspected to identify potential unique outlier cases (i.e., SPSS identifies values 1.5 times 
the interquartile range [IQR] as potential outliers). Seventeen unique cases (i.e., participants), 
were identified as having scores on one (or more) of the outcome variables at values exceeding 
three standard deviations from the mean for an outcome variable(s).  
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Data trimming. Scores that were identified as exceeding three standard deviations from 
the mean for a given outcome variable were trimmed through winsorizing. Winsorized scores 
(i.e., those that exceeded three standards deviations above the mean) were reduced from their 
original value to a value equal to three standard deviations above the mean for that outcome 
variable. This allowed retention of these participants’ data while reducing the extremity of their 
scores, providing more accurate parameter estimates.    
 Manipulation Checks. 
 Mood induction. One-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) using post-hoc testing (with a 
Bonferonni correction for controlling family-wise error) were conducted to test if state mood was 
significantly different across mood conditions, and differed in the expected directions. 
Participants rated their happiness as significantly different across mood conditions (F(2, 320) = 
12.39, p < .001), such that participants in the positive mood condition rated their happiness (M = 
6.49, SD = 1.93) as significantly higher than those in the negative mood condition (M = 5.00, SD 
= 2.33); however, there was no significant difference in happiness ratings between the positive 
and neutral mood (M = 6.05, SD = 2.42) conditions. Participants also rated their sadness as 
significantly different across mood conditions (F(2, 320) = 22.57, p < .001), such that 
participants in the negative mood condition rated their sadness (M = 5.11, SD = 2.59) as 
significantly higher than those in the positive mood (M = 3.55, SD = 2.38) and neutral mood (M 
= 3.00, SD = 2.24) conditions. There was no significant difference among mood conditions in 
participants' ratings of relaxation (F(2, 320) = .905, p = .41). 
 Cost perception. Participants were asked three true/false questions pertaining to their 
understanding of the anonymity/confidentiality of their answers in order to check if they attended 
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to the cost perception manipulation. The large majority of participants (n = 319; 96.4%) 
answered all three or two of the three questions in the expected direction, indicating that they 
attended to the cost perception manipulation (n = 287; 86.7%, n = 32; 9.6%, respectively).   
 Covariates and the outcome variables. Bivariate correlations were calculated among all 
potential continuous covariates, i.e., social desirability (Marlowe-Crowne Short Form C scores), 
erotophilia (Sexual Opinion Survey scores), trait depression (Trait Depression subscale scores), 
and trait happiness (Oxford Happiness Inventory scores); and the outcome variables (i.e., number 
and frequency of deviant sexual fantasies, masturbatory fantasies, and behaviors), to test if a 
relationship existed (see Table 2). Social desirability (i.e.,M-C scores) , erotophilia (SOS scores), 
and trait depression (T-DEP) were significantly or marginally  related to all outcome variables, 
and therefore, included in subsequent analyses. Trait happiness (OHI scores) was not 
significantly related to any of the outcome variables, and therefore, it was not included as a 
covariate in any of the subsequent analyses. Table 2 consists of the correlation matrix among all 
continuous covariates and the outcome variables.  Social desirability and erotophilia were 
moderately negatively correlated with number and frequency of deviant sexual fantasies, 
masturbatory fantasies, and behaviors reported; while trait depression was weakly positively 
correlated with these outcomes. Trait happiness  was not significantly correlated with any of the 
outcome variables.  
With respect to potential covariates that are categorical (i.e., gender and ethnicity), 
analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted to test for significant differences in the number 
or frequency of deviant sexual fantasies, masturbatory fantasies, or behaviors. No significant 
differences were found between males and females (very few individuals identified as 
transgendered, and therefore, were not included in this analysis), or among different ethnic 
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groups, on any of the outcome variables. Therefore, gender and ethnicity were excluded as 
covariates from subsequent analyses.  
 Hypothesis Testing. 
Number of participants endorsing any deviant sexual fantasies, masturbatory fantasies, 
and behaviors (Hypotheses 1 and 4).  In order to calculate the number of participants who 
endorsed the presence of any deviant sexual fantasies, all fantasy items were dichotomized into 
dummy variables, such that if participants endorsed “never” experiencing a given fantasy, it was 
coded as “absent” (0); if the participant endorsed experiencing a given fantasy at a frequency 
other than “never,” it was coded as “present” (1). A chi-square analysis was then conducted to 
investigate whether the number of participants who endorsed the presence of any deviant sexual 
fantasies differed across the six conditions. This process was repeated for masturbatory fantasies 
and behaviors. In general, it appeared fewer happy or sad participants disclosed the presence of 
deviant sexual fantasies, masturbatory fantasies, and behaviours under high cost conditions (i.e., 
when assurances of anonymity were not guaranteed) than when under low cost conditions (i.e., 
anonymity was assured) (see Figure 1); a more detailed analysis by domain is provided below.  
Number of participants endorsing any deviant sexual fantasies. A chi-square analysis 
found that mood or cost perception did not affect the percentage (number) of participants who 
disclosed deviant sexual fantasies, χ2 (5, N =282) = 7.55, p = .18. In total, 90.8% of participants 
reported experiencing at least one deviant sexual fantasy. Cell assignment rates were as follows:  
Low Cost Perception + Positive Mood (LowPos) =  17.0% (48); High Cost Perception + Positive 
Mood (HighPos) = 13.5% (38); Low Cost Perception + Neutral Mood (LowNeut) = 15.6% (44); 
High Cost Perception + Neutral Mood (HighNeut) = 16.7% (47); Low Cost Perception + 
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Negative Mood (LowNeg) = 16.0% (45); High Cost Perception + Negative Mood (HighNeg) = 
12.1% (34). For those that endorsed the presence of any deviant sexual fantasies, the two most 
commonly endorsed types were masochistic (81.3%; e.g., “being bound or tied up”) and sadistic 
(76.6%; e.g., “dominating/controlling a sexual partner”), and the least commonly endorsed was 
pedophilic (4.3%; i.e., young boys or girls “age 10 and under”). More specifically, males 
reported exhibitionistic (83.5%; e.g., “sex in public places”) and sadistic (79.6%) as the most 
common, and females reported masochistic (90.2%) and exhibitionistic (79.7%) as the most 
common. The least commonly reported deviant sexual fantasy was pedophilic for both males 
(8.7%) and females (1.3%).      
Number of participants endorsing any deviant sexual masturbatory fantasies. A chi-
square analysis found a non-significant trend for the effect of mood and cost perception on the 
percentage (number) of participants who disclosed deviant sexual masturbatory fantasies, χ2 (5, N 
=284) = 9.36, p = .10. In total, 77.8% of participants reported masturbating to at least one deviant 
sexual fantasy. Cell assignment rates were as follows:  LowPos = 13.0% (37); HighPos = 10.6% 
(30); LowNeut = 14.4% (41); HighNeut = 13.0% (37); LowNeg = 15.8% (45); HighNeg = 10.9% 
(31). The two most commonly endorsed masturbatory fantasy types were masochistic (68.4%) 
and sadistic (66.0%), and the least commonly endorsed was pedophilic (2.7%). Males reported 
sadistic (71.8%) and exhibitionistic (67.0%) as the most common, and females reported 
masochistic (75.2%) and sadistic (62.1%) as the most common. The least commonly reported 
masturbatory fantasy was pedophilic for both males (6.8%) and females (0.0%).            
Number of participants endorsing any deviant sexual behaviours. A chi-square analysis 
found that mood or cost perception did not affect the percentage (number) of participants who 
disclosed deviant sexual behaviours, χ2 (5, N =289) = 8.41, p = .14. In total, 83.4% of participants 
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reported engaging in at least one deviant sexual behavior. Cell assignment rates were as follows:  
LowPos =  14.9% (43); HighPos = 10.4% (30); LowNeut = 14.5% (42); HighNeut = 15.6% (45); 
LowNeg = 15.6% (45); HighNeg = 12.5% (36). The two most commonly endorsed types of 
deviant sexual behaviours were masochistic (67.2%) and sadistic (66.0%), and the least 
commonly endorsed was pedophilic (0.8%). Males reported sadistic (68.0%) and exhibitionistic 
(66.0%) behavior as the most common, and females reported masochistic (75.2%) and sadistic 
(64.7%) as the most common. The least commonly reported deviant sexual behaviour was 
pedophilic for both males (1.9%) and females (0.0%).            
Number of deviant sexual fantasies, masturbatory fantasies, and behaviors 
(Hypotheses 2 and 5). The subsample of participants who endorsed the presence of any deviant 
sexual fantasies  (i.e., approximately 91% of the total sample) were included in subsequent 
analyses. In order to calculate the number of deviant sexual fantasies endorsed by a participant, 
the number of fantasies endorsed as “present” by a participant were tabulated to provide a total 
number of deviant sexual fantasies.  The same tabulations were conducted for masturbatory 
fantasies and behaviors, providing a total number of deviant sexual fantasies, masturbatory 
fantasies, and behaviors for each participant.  
 Number of deviant sexual fantasies.  A two-way analysis of covariance (two-way 
ANCOVA) was conducted to test for main and interaction effects of mood and cost perception 
on disclosure of number of deviant sexual fantasies, controlling for social desirability, 
erotophilia, and trait depression (See Tables 3.1 and 3.2). There was no significant main effect 
for mood on number of sexual fantasies disclosed, F(2, 204) = .05, p = .95, ηp
2 < .01. However, 
there was a significant main effect of cost perception (F(1, 204) = 6.26, p = .01, ηp
2 = .03), such 
that participants in the low cost perception condition disclosed more deviant sexual fantasies (M  
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= 11.58, SD = 8.20) than participants in the high cost perception condition (M  = 9.25, SD = 
7.73). There was no significant interaction between mood and cost perception (F(2, 204) = 1.33, 
p = .27, ηp
2 = .01) (see Figure 2).  
Number of deviant sexual masturbatory fantasies. Similarly, there was no significant 
main effect for mood on number of deviant sexual masturbatory fantasies disclosed, F(2, 198) = 
1.30, p = .28, ηp
2 = .01. However, there was a significant main effect for cost perception on the 
number of deviant sexual masturbatory fantasies disclosed (F(1, 198) = 7.82, p = .01, ηp
2 = .04), 
such that participants in the low cost perception condition disclosed more deviant sexual 
masturbatory fantasies (M  = 9.35, SD = 7.63) than participants in the high cost perception 
condition (M  = 7.11, SD = 6.48) (See Tables 4.1 and 4.2). There was no significant interaction 
between mood and cost perception (F(2, 198) = .61, p = .55, ηp
2 = .01) (See Figure 3). 
Number of deviant sexual behaviors. There were no significant main effects for mood 
(F(2, 197) = 1.97, p = .14, ηp
2 = .02) or cost perception (F(1, 197) = .08, p = .78, ηp
2 < .01) (See 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2), or interaction between mood and cost perception (F(2, 197) = .99, p = .37, 
ηp
2 = .01), on the number of deviant sexual behaviors disclosed (See Figure 4). 
Frequency of deviant sexual fantasies, masturbatory fantasies, and behaviors  
(Hypotheses 3 and 6).  In order to calculate total frequency scores, deviant sexual fantasy items 
scores were retained in their original interval scale (i.e., 0 - 4) and summed to provide a total 
frequency score for each participant. The same calculations were conducted for deviant sexual 
masturbatory fantasies and behaviors.  
Frequency of deviant sexual fantasies. There was no significant main effect for mood on 
the total frequency of sexual fantasies disclosed, F(2, 211) = .02, p = .98, ηp
2 < .01. However, 
there was a significant main effect of cost perception (F(1, 211) = 5.43, p = .02, ηp
2 = .03), such 
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that participants in the low cost perception condition disclosed a total greater frequency score for 
deviant sexual fantasies (M  = 20.59, SD = 16.01) than participants in the high cost perception 
condition (M  = 15.86, SD = 14.60) (See Tables 6.1 and 6.2).. There was no significant 
interaction between mood and cost perception (F(2, 211) = 1.59, p = .21, ηp
2 = .02) on the 
frequency of deviant sexual fantasies reported (See Figure 5). 
Frequency of deviant sexual masturbatory fantasies. Note, in this model, Levene’s test 
suggested the assumption of homogeneity of variances was violated, F(5, 201) = 2.57, p = .03; 
indicating that the variances among the cells may be significantly different. Inspection of the 
standard deviations (from which the variances are derived) suggested the likely source of this 
violation was the difference in variance between the low cost-neutral mood and high cost-
negative mood conditions. However, when sample sizes are large, as is the current sample, 
Levene’s test can be overly sensitive in detecting unequal variances. In this case, using Hartley’s 
Fmax test can produce a more accurate test of the assumption of homogeneity of variances (Field, 
2013, p. 193). Results of the Hartley’s Fmax test found that the assumption was satisfied, Fmax(5, 
33) = 2.52 (which did not exceed the critical value, Fmax-crit = 2.78). Therefore, the results of 
ANCOVA are likely robust and interpretable.  There was no significant main effect for mood on 
the total frequency of deviant sexual masturbatory fantasies disclosed, F(2, 198) = 2.19, p = .11, 
ηp
2 = .02. However, there was a significant main effect for cost perception on the total frequency 
of deviant sexual masturbatory fantasies disclosed (F(1, 198) = 6.35, p < .01, ηp
2 = .03), such that 
participants in the low cost perception condition disclosed a higher total frequency of deviant 
sexual masturbatory fantasies (M  = 16.64, SD = 14.53) than participants in the high cost 
perception condition (M  = 12.65, SD = 12.74) (See Tables 7.1 and 7.2). There was no significant 
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interaction between mood and cost perception (F(2, 198) = 1.78, p = .17, ηp
2 = .02) (See Figure 
6). 
Frequency of deviant sexual behaviors. There were no significant main effects for mood 
(F(2, 197) = 1.31, p = .27, ηp
2 = .01) or cost perception (F(1, 197) = .07, p = .80, ηp
2 < .01) (See 
Tables 8.1 and 8.2), or interaction between mood and cost perception (F(2, 197) = .85, p = .43, 
ηp




CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
This study examined the effects of mood and cost perception on the sexual self-
disclosure.  We hypothesized that mood and cost perception (by proxy of 
anonymity/confidentiality assurances) would separately, and through interaction with each other,  
be associated with participants’ willingness to disclose deviant sexual fantasies, masturbatory 
fantasies, and behaviors. 
Our hypotheses were not supported, however several interesting patterns emerged when 
the data was examined through plots and figures. Approximately 90% of our sample endorsed 
the presence of any deviant sexual fantasies and more than 75% endorsed engaging in deviant 
sexual behavior. This is similar to our previous research findings with two undergraduate 
samples, wherein approximately 83% endorsed the presence of deviant sexual fantasy (Maile, J., 
Maile, C., & Allwood, 2010) and approximately 70% endorsed deviant sexual behavior (Maile, 
C., Maile, J., & Jeglic, 2009). We also found that approximately 78% of our sample reported 
masturbating to a deviant sexual fantasy. It should be noted, there are few studies examining 
prevalence rates of global deviant sexual fantasy in non-offending samples, and the majority of 
these studies examine the prevalence of specific domains of deviant sexual fantasy or behaviour, 
such as pedophilia or coerceive sexuality (i.e., rape-related). One study found that  in a large 
German community sample, approximately 59% endorsed the presence of a paraphilic fantasy, 
approximately 48% endorsed a paraphilic masturbatory fantasy, and approximately 44% reported 
engaging in a paraphilic behaviour (Ahlers, Schaefer, Mundt, Roll, Englert, et al., 2009).  
Although the prevalence estimates in this study are lower than ours, this is likely because the 
range of paraphilic (or deviant) fantasies and behaviours studied were more restricted in number 
and focus compared to the current study. In another study specifically focusing on prevalence of 
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deviant sexual behaviours, Templeman and Stinnett (1991) found that approximately 65% of an 
relatively small male undergraduate sample reported engaging in some form of potentially illegal 
sexual behaviour (e.g., frotteurism, voyeurism, coercive sex, etc.); however, this prevalence rate 
is difficult to compare to the our result given the wider breadth of deviant sexual behaviours that 
were canvassed in the current study, some of which were not potentially illegal (e.g., sadistic or 
masochistic sex acts with consenting partners), thereby likely increasing our ability to detect the 
presence of deviant sexual behaviours. Our results build on the findings of these previous studies 
by providing a wider range of sexual fantasies and behaviours under study, including non-
criminal ones and additional paraphilic ones (e.g., coercive sex).  
Our findings also indicate that  cost perception  significantly influenced the number and 
frequency of deviant sexual and masturbatory fantasies disclosed, such that participants who 
perceived their responses to be anonymous and confidential, disclosed a greater number and 
frequency of these compared to those whose anonymity/confidentiality was not assured.  These 
results are similar to previous research suggesting that individuals are more likely to disclose 
information when assured of anonymity/confidentiality compared to when they are not (e.g., 
Durant et al. 2002, Smith & Tschann, 1999). Notably, this effect was not found with respect to 
deviant sexual behaviors. It could be speculated that assurances of anonymity/confidentiality 
only facilitate disclosure when the domain of disclosure is not too threatening. In other words, 
participants were willing to admit to deviant sexual fantasies, and masturbating to these (both of 
which are private events); but less likely willing to admit engaging in the corresponding sexual 
act, which may involve another person(s) (a non-private event), and in some cases, be criminal in 
nature (e.g., pedophilic or coercive sexual activity).  This suggests that anonymity/confidentiality 
may have an “upper limit” in its efficacy in facilitating disclosure, such that assurances of 
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anonymity/confidentiality may promote disclosure of sensitive information to a point, but when 
this threshold is passed (e.g., information that may lead to sanctions), the potential cost of 
disclosure is perceived to be too high, negating the facilitative effect of 
anonymity/confidentiality. 
Mood, regardless of whether it was negative, neutral, or positive in valence, did not 
significantly influence sexual self-disclosure. Participants disclosed approximately the same 
number and frequency of deviant sexual fantasies, masturbatory fantasies, and behaviors 
irrespective of mood. This is largely inconsistent with the findings of two studies examining the 
effects of mood on non-sexual self-disclosure. Cunningham (1988) and Forgas (2011) both 
found that positive mood facilitated disclosure of a greater breadth and/or depth of intimate 
information of a non-sexual nature to same-aged peers. However, there are several 
methodological differences between these two studies and the current study that make 
interpretation of these differences difficult; both and Cunningham’s (1988) and Forgas’ (2011) 
studies examined disclosure of relatively non-threatening information (compared to sexual self-
disclosure), and these disclosures were conducted with undergraduate participants (compared to 
community participants), and involved disclosure in an interpersonal context (compared to on a 
survey). In addition, the current study controlled for various variables, such as social desirability, 
and trait mood, which the other studies did not.     
Finally, in terms of our hypothesized interaction effects, positive mood did not 
significantly interact with cost perception in influencing sexual self-disclosure. This may reflect 
a genuine lack of interactive effect between mood and cost perception on sexual self-disclosure. 
However, as noted above, this appears to contradict the findings of Cunningham (1988) and 
Forgas (2011). Another possible explanation for the failure to find an effect for mood or an 
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interaction effect between mood and cost perception is the relatively weak mood manipulation 
(see Limitations Section below).    
It should be noted that despite our failure to find a statistically meaningful effect of 
mood, or interaction effect between mood and cost perception, an interesting and generally 
consistent pattern of effects, although small and arguably trivial, was observed across all models 
tested and merits mention. It appeared that happy and sad mood may actually slightly depress 
initial willingness to disclose when the potential perceived cost for doing is high. This is 
consistent with the literature on positive mood and risky decision making, such that individuals 
in a positive mood tend to engage in less risky behavior when a potential outcome is perceived as 
high in cost, as was the case in the present study. However, for those individuals who do 
disclose, it appeared sad mood may actually slightly increase sexual self-disclosure, when the 
perceived cost is low, but not when it is high. The pattern of findings for negative mood and 
sexual self-disclosure in the current study is less straightforward and more difficult to interpret 
given the mixed findings in the literature.  In the present study, when examing the entire sample, 
sad mood appeared to decrease initial willingness to sexually self-disclose; that is, fewer 
participants in a sad mood disclosed the presence of any deviant sexual fantasy, masturbatory 
fantasies, or behaviours. However, when the subsample of participants who disclosed the 
presence of any deviant sexual fantasy, masturbatory fantasy, or behaviours was examined 
separately, sad mood appeared to decrease sexual self-disclosure when the potential cost for 
doing so was low, but increase some forms of sexual self-disclosure (i.e., deviant sexual fantasies 
and masturbatory fantasies) slightly when the potential cost for doing so was high.  The 
experimental findings of previous studies offer little insight into this pattern of results; however, 
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theoretical work concerning the potential motivational role of negative mood in risky decision 
making offers some insight.  
The mood repair hypothesis would suggest individuals in a negative mood will only 
engage in risky behavior if the risky situation has a potential to pay off—that is be high in 
potential cost/gain (e.g., win a prize)—and improve their mood (Isen & Geva, 1987). In this 
case, individuals in a negative mood (who tend to overestimate the probability of a negative 
outcome) switch from a probability-focus to a cost-focus to guide decision making. In the 
present study, participants had nothing material to gain for sexually self-disclosing, yet sad 
participants disclosed slightly more than happy or neutral mood participants. Therefore, it would 
appear that the mood repair hypothesis fails to account for this pattern. This apparent 
contradiction can be resolved by examining the work of Bruyneel and colleagues (2009), who 
suggested that the act of engaging in risky decision making itself (while in a negative mood) 
provides hedonic value and a mood repairing function rather than the promise of a potential 
material reward. According to this logic, under low cost conditions, where there is nothing “real” 
to lose/gain, the act of risky decision making would not provide the same hedonic value (and 
therefore mood repairing function) as would risky decision making under high cost conditions. 
Therefore, individuals would theoretically focus on the probability of the outcome rather than the 
cost/gain (which is negligible) to guide their decision making. Accordingly, it would be expected 
that under low cost conditions, individuals in a negative mood would likely be more risk-averse 
because there is little hedonic value to be gained from the risky decision. Conversely, under high 
cost/gain conditions, individuals in a negative mood would theoretically switch from a 
probability-focus to a cost-focus to guide decision making, resulting in riskier decision making in 




 There are several limitations to the current study, including:  sample size, the mood 
induction procedure, the cost perception manipulation, the nature of the information being 
disclosed, and the possible gender bias of the sexual fantasy/behavior questionnaire used.  
 First, the study was underpowered. Although the overall sample was relatively large, the 
sizes of individual cells (conditions) were considerably smaller, which may have made detection 
of experimental effects more difficult, particularly if the hypothesized mood effect on sexual 
self-disclosure was relatively weak.  
 Second, although the mood induction was effective in shifting moods in the expected 
directions, the magnitude of these shifts may have been too small/weak. Two other studies that 
examined the influence of mood on self-disclosure, and both of which found that positive mood 
increased the breadth and/or depth of verbal personal disclosure, typically noted larger shifts in 
mood than was found in the current study. In the current study, the difference in happiness 
between the positive and negative mood conditions was approximately 1.5 points (on a 10-point 
scale), while Cunningham (1988) and Forgas (2011) both reported the equivalent of roughly a 2 
and 4-point difference, respectively. This does not appear to be the result of the type of the mood 
induction procedure selected (i.e., an autobiographic memory recall task) because Forgas used an 
autobiographical memory recall task; however, it may be that the online modality in which it was 
presented may have undermined its efficacy. Inspection of individual participant responses on 
the mood induction task suggested that participants generally did not provide as much detailed 
information about an emotionally valenced memory, nor attend to the emotional content of this 
memory, as instructed, thereby possibly diluting the strength of the mood manipulation.  In 
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addition, the transient effect of the mood induction may have also diluted its effect, particularly 
given the length of the sexual fantasy and behavior questionnaire (252 items). The effect of the 
mood induction would have been temporary and likely not have endured throughout the entirety 
of the survey; therefore, mood, if it had an effect, likely would have only influenced disclosure 
for the initial part of the survey, making detection of an experimental effect difficult.  
 Also, Forgas (2002 as cited in Forgas, 2011) suggested that having participants rate their 
mood immediately after a mood induction procedure may actually depress the effect of the mood 
induction; which was the method selected for the current study. However, this was an intentional 
part of the study design because having participants wait until the end of the current study to rate 
their mood, particularly given the length of the survey and the transient effects of mood 
inductions, may have made the detection of mood effects, if present, difficult, if not impossible.  
Third, another possible limitation is the strength of the cost perception manipulation. In 
the current study, participants in the high cost perception condition were instructed that there was 
a random chance they may be selected for an in-person follow-up interview after completing the 
survey, which we believed would increase the perceived "cost" involved in disclosing deviant 
sexual fantasies, masturbatory fantasies, and behaviors. This appeared to be supported by our 
results, given that participants in the low cost perception condition reported a greater number and 
frequency of deviant sexual fantasies and masturbatory fantasies than those in the high cost 
condition. However, participants were not asked what they perceived the probability of this 
interview occurring may have been (e.g., 10%? 25%?); therefore, it remains unclear to what 
degree individual variation in this subjective estimate may have impacted the strength of this 
manipulation. In other words, if the probability had been fixed and provided to participants, it 
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may have strengthened or diminished the strength of the manipulation, and consequently 
influenced sexual self-disclosure accordingly.  
Fourth, the specific domain of deviant sexual fantasies, masturbatory fantasies, and 
behaviors may be an atypically threatening area of personal disclosure, such that potential effects 
of mood and cost perception on disclosure of these may be depressed compared to disclosure in 
less threatening domains (e.g., drug use, political leanings/opinions). It is conceivable that this 
may have introduced a floor-type effect. From a statistical standpoint, this would restrict the true 
range of the outcome variables, particularly at the higher end of the range, which could lead to 
greater difficulty in detecting an experimental effect. In other words, this could mean that 
participants were more likely to fail to report/underreport deviant sexual fantasies, masturbatory 
fantasies, and behaviors. In addition, this effect may become stronger as the social prohibitions 
against these increase; for example, reporting a deviant sexual fantasy (e.g., coercive sex) is 
likely less threatening than reporting engaging in the corresponding behaviour.   
Fifth, the nature of the sexual fantasy and behavior questionnaire used in the current 
study could be criticized for being gender-biased. Previous researchers have noted that most 
sexual fantasy/behavior inventories ask about action-oriented sexual fantasies/behaviors (i.e., 
overt and explicit acts), which males are more likely to report a greater number and frequency of 
compared to females. Research suggests that females are more likely to endorse a greater 
frequency of relationship-oriented or romantic fantasies than males (Dindia & Allen, 1998; 
Leitenberg & Henning, 1995), a class of fantasies/behaviors that is admittedly lacking in the 
questionnaire used in the present study. Therefore, we may have employed a survey that 
underrepresented the sexual fantasy life, deviant or otherwise, of females, thereby possibly 
depressing the overall reported incidence and frequency of deviant sexual fantasies and 
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behaviors in this subsample, and consequently, the entire sample. However, this does not appear 
to be the case in our study. Our results showed that approximately equivalent percentages of 
males and females endorsed deviant sexual fantasies and behaviour, although of different types. 
For example, over 80% of men and women reported exhibitionistic fantasy and masochistic 
fantasy, respectively. Similarly, over 65% of men and women reported sadistic sexual behavior 
and masochistic sexual behavior, respectively. Therefore, the sexual fantasy/behavior 
questionnaire in the current study did not appear to evidence gender bias, at least in terms of 
underdetecting deviant sexual fantasy and behavior in women.   
Future Research 
 Future research could examine a variety of promising avenues that could expand on the 
statistically significant results, and explore and clarify non-significant ones. To build on the 
significant results, one area would be to examine the effects of mood and cost perception on 
disclosure of domains other than deviant sexual fantasies and behavior, and that vary in the 
degree of which they considered are socially taboo (e.g., drug use, political opinions, etc.). To 
build on and clarify the non-significant results, a variety of mood induction techniques, or 
variation in the presentation of the mood induction modality (e.g., in-person rather than online), 
could potentially strengthen the mood manipulation and clarify whether mood, and the 
interactive effect of mood and cost perception, influence sexual self-disclosure.    
Other interesting avenues of future research could address some of the limitations of the 
current study and offer interesting insights of their own. For example, given the time-limited 
duration of mood inductions, creating and integrating an emotional conditioning paradigm into 
the survey itself could theoretically increase the duration of mood induction and make detection 
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of mood effects, if present, easier. An initial emotional conditioning exercise could be used to 
associate features of the survey itself to a specific mood. For example, under the guise of a word 
recognition task, certain pages could present mood specific words (e.g., happy, content, elated) 
and be paired with non-relevant features (e.g., a page border), while other pages present non-
mood specific words with no additional features. This sequence could be repeated several times 
to increase the likelihood that the non-relevant feature would be associated with a specific mood, 
and this non-relevant feature could be interspersed in the actual outcome survey of interest, and 
in theory, extend the effect of the mood induction.  
 In conclusion, cost perception (i.e., anonymity/confidentiality) was found to have a 
significant but limitated effect on sexual self-disclosure, but mood, regardless of its valence, did 
not. However, the lack of a mood effect may be due to methodological limitations of the current 












     Female         58.6  (194)        
     Male         40.5  (134) 
     Transgender Female          0.3  (1) 
Ethnicity (n = 330) 
     White         42.4  (140) 
     Black         24.8  (82) 
     Latino         14.5  (48) 
     Asian/Pacific Islander       10.9  (36) 
     “Other”           7.3  (24)  
Sexual Orientation 
     Completely Heterosexual       72.8  (241) 
     Mostly Heterosexual       14.2  (47) 
     Bisexual           6.3  (21) 
     Mostly Homosexual         1.5  (5) 
     Completely Homosexual         4.2  (13) 
     Unsure           0.9  (3) 
Marital Status 
     Single          53.8  (169) 
     Steady boyfriend/girlfriend                  20.1  (63) 
     Married                                                 11.8  (37)       
     Cohabiting                                              8.6  (27) 
     Divorced                                                 3.2  (10) 







Table 2  
Correlation Matrix for Continuous Covariates and Outcome Variables 
*p<.05, **p<.01 
Note.  M-C = Marlowe-CrownE, SOS = Sexual Opinion Survey, OHI = Oxford Happiness Inventory, T-DEP = Trait depression, 
NumDSF = Number of deviant sexual fantasies, FrDSF = Total frequency score of deviant sexual fantasies, NumDSM = Number of 
deviant sexual masturbatory fantasies, FrDSM = Total frequency score of deviant sexual masturbatory fantasies, NumDSB = Number 
of deviant sexual behaviors, FrDSB = Total frequency score of deviant sexual behaviors. 


































































































































































































































Descriptive Statistics for Number of Deviant Sexual Fantasies by Mood and Cost Perception 
Note. Adjusted mean based upon:  Marlowe-Crowne total score = 5.97, Sexual Opinion Survey 




ANCOVA Summary for Number of Deviant Sexual Fantasies by Mood, Cost Perception, Social 
Desirability, Erotophilia, and Trait Depression 
Source SS df MS F 
Mood (M) 5.08 2     2.54 .05 
Cost Perception (C)       291.32 1 291.32 6.26* 
M-C       475.51 1 475.51 10.21** 
SOS     2673.99 1 2673.99 57.41** 
TDep         96.84 1     96.84         2.08 
M x C       124.13 2     62.07 .27 
     
Note. R2 = .31, adj. R2 = .28. 
*p < .05, **p < .01 
  
 Cost Perception   
 Low Cost High Cost 
Mood M Adj. M SD n M Adj. M SD n 
Positive 11.71 11.43 7.82 34 9.45 9.10 7.48 33 
Neutral 12.14 12.76 9.38 36 8.37 8.53 7.93 38 




Descriptive Statistics for Number of Deviant Sexual Masturbatory Fantasies by Mood and Cost 
Perception 
Note. Adjusted mean based upon:  Marlowe-Crowne total score = 5.97, Sexual Opinion Survey 
total score = 57.82, and Trait Depression subscale score = 20.35. 
 
Table 4.2 
ANCOVA Summary for Number of Deviant Sexual Masturbatory Fantasies by Mood, Cost 
Perception, Social Desirability, Erotophilia, and Trait Depression 
Source SS df MS F 
Mood (M) 96.78 2 48.39 1.30 
Cost Perception (C)        291.81 1        291.81     7.82** 
M-C        406.75 1        406.75   10.90** 
SOS      2042.67 1      2042.67  54.76** 
TDep          30.30 1          30.30   .369 
M x C        124.13 2 62.07 .27 
     
Note. R2 = .31, adj. R2 = .28. 
**p < .01 
  
 Cost Perception   
 Low Cost High Cost 
Mood M Adj. M SD n M Adj. M SD n 
Positive 8.85 8.59 7.56 34 6.57 5.96 5.82 30 
Neutral   10.03   10.65 8.81 35 7.02 7.24 7.34 38 




Descriptive Statistics for Number of Deviant Sexual Behaviors by Mood and Cost Perception 
Note. Adjusted mean based upon:  Marlowe-Crowne total score = 5.95, Sexual Opinion Survey 
total score = 57.65, and Trait Depression subscale score = 20.19. 
 
Table 5.2 
ANCOVA Summary for Number of Deviant Sexual Behaviors by Mood, Cost Perception, Social 
Desirability, Erotophilia, and Trait Depression 
Source SS df MS F 
Mood (M)         75.44 2         37.72 1.97 
Cost Perception (C) 1.57 1 1.57   .08 
M-C         52.90 1         52.90 2.76 
SOS       821.17 1       821.17   42.83** 
TDep         37.76 1         37.76          1.97 
M x C         38.05 2         19.03    .99 
     
Note. R2 = .23, adj. R2 = .19. 
**p < .01 
  
 Cost Perception   
 Low Cost High Cost 
Mood M Adj. M SD n M Adj. M SD n 
Positive 5.59 5.43 4.55 34 5.86 5.67 4.36 28 
Neutral 7.08 7.49 5.95 36 6.03 6.12 5.41 38 




Descriptive Statistics for Frequency of Deviant Sexual Fantasies by Mood and Cost Perception 
Note. Adjusted mean based upon:  Marlowe-Crowne total score =  5.97, Sexual Opinion Survey 
total score = 57.94, and Trait Depression subscale score = 20.34. 
 
Table 6.2 
ANCOVA Summary for Frequency of Deviant Sexual Fantasies by Mood, Cost Perception, 
Social Desirability, Erotophilia, and Trait Depression 
Source SS df MS F 
Mood (M) 176.86 2 88.43 .52 
Cost Perception (C)       1178.45 1      1178.45 6.94** 
M-C       1391.25 1      1391.25 8.20** 
SOS     10431.38 1    10431.38      61.45** 
TDep         566.16 1        566.16        3.34 
M x C 760.33 2        380.17        2.24 
     
Note. R2 = .32, adj. R2 = .29. 
**p < .01 
  
 Cost Perception   
 Low Cost High Cost 
Mood M Adj. M SD n M Adj. M SD n 
Positive 19.79 19.27 15.42 34 15.42 14.87 13.19 33 
Neutral 22.81 24.10 18.79 36 14.32 19.78 15.46 38 




Descriptive Statistics of Frequency of Deviant Sexual Masturbatory Fantasies by Mood and Cost 
Perception 
Note. Adjusted mean based upon:  Marlowe-Crowne total score = 5.97, Sexual Opinion Survey 
total score = 57.94, and Trait Depression subscale score = 20.34. 
 
Table 7.2 
ANCOVA Summary for Frequency of Deviant Sexual Masturbatory Fantasies by Mood, Cost 
Perception, Social Desirability, Erotophilia, and Trait Depression 
Source SS df MS F 
Mood (M) 597.54 2 298.77 2.19 
Cost Perception (C) 865.36 1 865.36   6.35* 
M-C 781.17 1 781.17   5.73* 
SOS       8394.43 1       8394.43   61.57** 
TDep         357.62 1         357.62 2.62 
M x C 484.69 2 242.35 1.78 
     
Note. R2 = .32, adj. R2 = .29. 
*p < .05, **p < .01 
  
 Cost Perception   
 Low Cost High Cost 
Mood M Adj. M SD n M Adj. M SD n 
Positive 14.24 13.73 12.24 34 11.83 10.99 11.50 30 
Neutral 19.46 20.76 18.16 35 12.11 12.39 14.68 38 




Descriptive Statistics of Frequency of Deviant Sexual Behaviors by Mood and Cost Perception 
Note. Adjusted mean based upon:  Marlowe-Crowne total score = 5.95, Sexual Opinion Survey 
total score = 57.65, and Trait Depression subscale score = 20.19. 
 
Table 8.2 
ANCOVA Summary for Frequency of Deviant Sexual Behaviors by Mood, Cost Perception, 
Social Desirability, Erotophilia, and Trait Depression 
Source SS df MS F 
Mood (M)       146.07 2         73.04         1.31 
Cost Perception (C) 3.67 1 3.67 .07 
M-C         76.88 1         76.88         1.38 
SOS     2591.50 1     2591.50 46.49** 
TDep       107.34 1       107.34         1.93 
M x C         95.00 2         47.50 .85 
     
Note. R2 = .22, adj. R2 = .19. 
**p < .05 
 
  
 Cost Perception   
 Low Cost High Cost 
Mood M Adj. M SD n M Adj. M SD n 
Positive   8.71   8.38 7.86 34 9.07 8.82 7.16 28 
Neutral 10.75 11.48 9.97 36 9.16 9.32 9.20 38 





Note. Fant = Fantasy, Mast = Masturbatory fantasy, Beh = Behavior 
Figure 1. Percentage of Participants Endorsing Deviant Sexual Fantasies, Masturbatory Fantasies, and 














































































































































































































































Informed Consent Form (Low Cost) 
You are invited to participate in this study.  This study is part of a program of research that is 
looking at the sexual fantasies and behaviors of a community and undergraduate population.  If 
you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to complete questionnaires relating to 
basic demographic information, illegal activities, psychiatric history, sexual fantasies and 
behavior, and your general attitudes toward sexual topics.   
The questionnaires will take approximately 60-75 minutes to complete.  Although there are no 
major risks associated with participating in this study, some of the questions are of a personal 
and explicit nature that may cause people to feel nervous, sad, angry, or aroused while filling out 
the questionnaires.  Although most people can stand these feelings, some cannot.  If you think 
that you cannot stand to experience these feelings then you should not participate in this study. 
We, the researchers, do not expect that you will directly benefit by participating in this study.  
However, if you complete the study, you will receive $12.50.  In order to receive payment, you 
will need a credit/debit card and you will have to sign up with PayPal (an independent site that is 
unaffiliated with the study).  We chose to pay participants through PayPal because it is an 
independent and reputable secure online payment service, unaffiliated with our study. In this 
way, your payment information is completely separate from your questionnaire responses, 
thereby maintaining your privacy and confidentiality.  
Finally, the benefit to be gained from participating in this study and filling out the questionnaires 
is that this study might help us understand more about sexual fantasies and behavior that people 
from the general population experience and engage in.  
Participation is completely voluntary.  If you choose to participate in this study, but then decide 
you do not want to participate, you may stop filling out the questionnaires at any time, for any 
reason.  You may also refuse to answer any question without penalty.  In addition, we have 
included a “Prefer to not respond” option to all questions.  It is important that you realize that if 
you decide not to participate or choose to discontinue participating after the study has begun, you 
will not be penalized; it will not, in any way, affect your relationship with John Jay or any of its 
faculty.  You will still be paid $12.50 for your participation.  
If you agree to participate in this research study, all the information gathered in this study will be 
identified with a code number ONLY, so your name will not be attached to any of the 
information you provide.  Your responses are confidential and anonymous.  All information will 
be kept in a locked office and will only be viewed by members of the research team for purposes 
of data scoring and analysis.  Data will be analyzed on a group level (i.e., we are not interested in 
any one particular participant’s responses).  Therefore, your responses cannot be attached to any 
personal information that would identify you.  
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If, after participating in this study, you have any questions or concerns about the study or about 
your participation in the project, you may contact the primary researcher coordinating this study, 
Jordan Maile (jmaile@jjay.cuny.edu).  If you prefer, you may contact the project supervisor, Dr. 
Allwood at mallwood@jjay.cuny.edu at the Department of Psychology, John Jay College of 
Criminal Justice, 445 West 59th Street, New York, NY 10019.  If you have questions about your 
rights as a research participant, or you have comments or concerns that you would like to discuss 
with someone other than the researchers, please call the CUNY Research Compliance 
Administrator at 646-664-8918. Alternately, you can write to:  
 
CUNY Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research  
Attn: Research Compliance Administrator  
205 East 42nd Street  
New York, NY 10017  
 
If you would like to participate in this study, check the box indicating you have read and 




Understanding of Consent Form (Low Cost Manipulation Check) 
 
Because this study is being conducted online, we have no way of ensuring that participants 
understand conditions of anonymity/confidentiality in this study. In addition, participants do not 
have a research team member present to answer their questions. Therefore, we would ask that 
you answer the following questions to ensure your understanding of the consent form: 
 
1. My answers are completely confidential and anonymous. None of my answers can be 
traced back to me. 
True    False 
2. My answers will be identified by a participant number only. 
 
True    False 
 
3. Only the research team will have access to my data. 
  





Informed Consent Form (High Cost) 
You are invited to participate in this study.  This study is part of a program of research that is 
looking at the sexual fantasies and behaviors of a community and undergraduate population.  If 
you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to complete questionnaires relating to 
basic demographic information, illegal activities, psychiatric history, sexual fantasies and 
behavior, and your general attitudes toward sexual topics.   
The questionnaires will take approximately 60-75 minutes to complete.  Although there are no 
major risks associated with participating in this study, some of the questions are of a personal 
and explicit nature that may cause people to feel nervous, sad, angry, or aroused while filling out 
the questionnaires.  Although most people can stand these feelings, some cannot.  If you think 
that you cannot stand to experience these feelings then you should not participate in this study. 
We, the researchers, do not expect that you will directly benefit by participating in this study.  
However, if you complete the study, you will receive $12.50.  In order to receive payment, you 
will need a credit/debit card and you will have to sign up with PayPal (an independent site that is 
unaffiliated with the study).  We chose to pay participants through PayPal because it is an 
independent and reputable secure online payment service, unaffiliated with our study. In this 
way, your payment information is completely separate from your questionnaire responses, 
thereby maintaining your privacy and confidentiality.  
Finally, the benefit to be gained from participating in this study and filling out the questionnaires 
is that this study might help us understand more about sexual fantasies and behavior that people 
from the general population experience and engage in.  
Participation is completely voluntary.  If you choose to participate in this study, but then decide 
you do not want to participate, you may stop filling out the questionnaires at any time, for any 
reason.  You may also refuse to answer any question without penalty.  In addition, we have 
included a “Prefer to not respond” option to all questions.   It is important that you realize that if 
you decide not to participate or choose to discontinue participating after the study has begun, you 
will not be penalized; it will not, in any way, your relationship with John Jay or any of its 
faculty.  You will still be paid $12.50 for your participation.  
If you agree to participate in this research study, all the information gathered in this study will be 
identified with a code number, so your name will not be attached to any of the information you 
provide.  All information will be kept in a locked office and will only be viewed by members of 
the research team for purposes of data scoring and analysis.  Data will be analyzed on a group 
level (i.e., we are not interested in any one particular participant’s responses).  However, as part 
of the study, you may be randomly selected for a follow-up interview with a member of our 
research team. If this is the case, you will be asked to come, in-person, to discuss your 
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responses on the questionnaire with the interviewer (you will be paid for the interview as 
well). Please note that we will be randomly selecting participants for follow-up according to 
a lottery system of participant ID numbers, so your answers have nothing to do with the 
selection process. If you have been randomly selected for a follow-up interview, you will be 
asked to provide an email address at the end of the survey. If you are not asked to provide 
your email address at the end of the survey, than you were not one of the participants 
randomly selected for follow-up.   
If, after participating in this study, you have any questions or concerns about the study or about 
your participation in the project, you may contact the primary researcher coordinating this study, 
Jordan Maile (jmaile@jjay.cuny.edu).  If you prefer, you may contact the project supervisor, Dr. 
Allwood at mallwood@jjay.cuny.edu at the Department of Psychology, John Jay College of 
Criminal Justice, 445 West 59th Street, New York, NY 10019.  If you have questions about your 
rights as a research participant, or you have comments or concerns that you would like to discuss 
with someone other than the researchers, please call the CUNY Research Compliance 
Administrator at 646-664-8918. Alternately, you can write to:  
 
CUNY Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research  
Attn: Research Compliance Administrator  
205 East 42nd Street  
New York, NY 10017 
 
If you would like to participate in this study, check the box indicating you have read and 




Understanding of Consent Form (High Cost Manipulation Check) 
 
Because this study is being conducted online, we have no way of ensuring that participants 
understand conditions of anonymity/confidentiality in this study. In addition, participants do not 
have a researcher present to answer their questions. Therefore, we ask that you answer the 
following questions to ensure your understanding of the consent form: 
1. Although my answers are completely private, there is a random chance I may be selected 
for an in-person interview with a research team member. 
True    False 
2. A lottery system of participant ID numbers is used to select participants for follow-up. 
 
True    False 
 
3. I will be asked to provide an email address at the end of the survey if I am randomly 
selected for a follow-up interview. 
 





Daily Record (Neutral Mood Induction Stimulus) 
You have just completed a demographic questionnaire, but in order to get a better sense of you as 
a person, we want to know what you do on a typical weekday. In the space below, please list in 
as much detail as possible what you do on a typical weekday. For example, what time do you 
usually get up? What do you usually have for breakfast? What are your routine activities (do you 
go to school, work, etc.)? What errands, if any, do you typically run? Do you usually meet or 
socialize with anyone? What do you do typically do at home at the end of the day (e.g., watch 





































Autobiographical Memory (Positive/Happy Mood Induction Stimulus) 
You have just completed a demographic questionnaire, but in order to get a better sense of you 
as a person, we want to know what makes you happy. On this page, please describe your 
happiest memory (either from childhood or more recently). Type in your answers in the fields 
provided.   
______________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Write a paragraph about your happiest memory (it can be from childhood, adolescence, 
etc., or a recent memory). 
 
2. When did this occur? 
 
3. Were any other people there? If so, who? 
 
4. What about this memory makes it your happiest one? 
 
 
5. Describe how you were feeling. 
 
 








7. How HAPPY do you feel RIGHT NOW? 
1 
(Not at 





























Autobiographical Memory (Sad Mood Induction Stimulus) 
You have just completed a demographic questionnaire, but in order to get a better sense of you 
as a person, we want to know what makes you sad. On this page, please describe your saddest 
memory (either from childhood or more recently). Type in your answers in the fields provided.   
______________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Write a paragraph about your saddest memory (it can be from childhood, adolescence, 
etc., or a recent memory). 
 
 
2. When did this occur? 
 
3. Were any other people there? If so, who? 
 
4. What about this memory makes it your saddest one? 
 
 
5. Describe how you were feeling. 
 
 
6. How SAD were you at the time of this memory? 
1(Not at 
all sad) 





































Sexual Fantasy Questionnaire 
 
This questionnaire asks you about your sexual interests in detail.  You will be asked to answer 
some sensitive questions about your sexual interests.  It is very important that you answer truthfully 
and if you feel uncomfortable in answering any/all of these questions then you should leave them 
blank rather than provide inaccurate information. All information that you provide on this 
questionnaire will be completely anonymous and cannot be traced to you individually.  The 
questionnaire should take approximately 15-30 minutes to complete.  We thank you for your time 
and honesty in completing this questionnaire. 
 
Report your level of sexual interest in relation to the following themes or situations:  
 
Levels of sexual interest  
 
0 = Have never fantasized about  
1 = Have fantasized about once or twice 
2 = Have fantasized about several times 
3 = Have fantasized about frequently 
4 = Have fantasized about very frequently 
     
Sexual interest in general:                           Level of interest 
1) Men                  0     1    2     3    4 
2) Women                  0     1    2     3    4 
3) Young boys (age 10 and under)               0     1    2     3    4 
4) Teenage boys (age 11-14)                0     1    2     3    4 
5) Young girls (age 10 and under)               0     1    2     3    4 
6) Teenage girls (age 11-14)                0     1    2     3    4 
 
Sexual interest in detail: 
7) Sex in beautiful settings                0     1    2     3    4 
8) Sex in public places                0     1    2     3    4 
9) Sex on silk or satin sheets                0     1    2     3    4 
10) Sex on rubber or plastic sheets               0     1    2     3    4 
11) Masturbating in front of a sexual partner              0     1    2     3    4 
12) Masturbating in front of a stranger              0     1    2     3    4 
13) Being masturbated by another person              0     1    2     3    4    
14) Cuddling                  0     1    2     3    4   
15) Performing oral sex (e.g., giving a blow job,  
going down on someone)                        0     1    2     3    4  
16) Receiving oral sex (e.g., giving a blow job,  
having someone going down on you)              0     1    2     3    4 
17) Passionate kissing                 0     1    2     3    4 
18) Touching intimate places                0     1    2     3    4 
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Level of sexual interest  
0 = Have never fantasized about  
1 = Have fantasized about once or twice 
2 = Have fantasized about several times 
3 = Have fantasized about frequently 
4 = Have fantasized about very frequently 
                   Level of interest 
19) Touching non-intimate places               0     1    2     3    4 
20) Wearing uniforms, masks, etc.               0     1    2     3    4   
21) Sex with an animal                            0     1    2     3    4 
22) Sex with inanimate (non-living) objects              0     1    2     3    4 
23) Causing mild pain to a sexual partner              0     1    2     3    4 
24) Causing severe pain to a sexual partner              0     1    2     3    4 
25) Being caused mild pain by a sexual partner             0     1    2     3    4 
26) Being caused severe pain by a sexual partner                        0     1    2     3    4 
27) Being strangled or asphyxiated by a sexual partner (without dying)     0     1    2     3    4 
28) Strangling or asphyxiating a sexual partner (without killing him/her)  0     1    2     3    4 
29) Sex with a dead person                0     1    2     3    4 
30) Being spanked                 0     1    2     3    4 
31) Spanking others                 0     1    2     3    4 
32) Torturing others                 0     1    2     3    4 
33) Being tortured                 0     1    2     3    4 
34) Being whipped on sexual parts of body (e.g., breasts, genitals)           0     1    2     3    4 
35) Being whipped on non-sexual parts of the body (e.g., legs, back)         0     1    2     3    4 
36) Whipping somebody else on sexual parts of the body  
(e.g., breasts, genitals)                0     1    2     3    4           
37) Whipping somebody else on non-sexual parts of the body  
(e.g., legs, back)                  0     1    2     3    4 
38) Defecating (shitting) on a sexual partner              0     1    2     3    4 
39) Violently raping somebody               0     1    2     3    4 
40) Being violently raped                0     1    2     3    4 
41) Humiliating somebody                0     1    2     3    4 
42) Being humiliated                 0     1    2     3    4 
43) Being bound or tied up                0     1    2     3    4 
44) Tying up somebody                0     1    2     3    4 
45) Drugging or sedating another person for sexual reasons            0     1    2     3    4 
46) Sex while drunk                 0     1    2     3    4 
47) Sex with a drunk person                0     1    2     3    4 
48) Anal intercourse                 0     1    2     3    4 
49) Sex in a bathroom                 0     1    2     3    4 
50) Physically attacking someone               0     1    2     3    4 
51) Being physically attacked                0     1    2     3    4 
52) Dominating/controlling a sexual partner              0     1    2     3    4 
53) Being dominated/controlled by a sexual partner             0     1    2     3    4 




Level of sexual interest  
0 = Have never fantasized about  
1 = Have fantasized about once or twice 
2 = Have fantasized about several times 
3 = Have fantasized about frequently 
4 = Have fantasized about very frequently 
                   Level of interest 
55) Forcing somebody to have sex against his/her will            0     1    2     3    4 
56) Sex while being threatened with a weapon             0     1    2     3    4 
57) Sex while threatening someone with a weapon             0     1    2     3    4 
58) Stalking or secretly following somebody              0     1    2     3    4 
59) Being stalked or secretly followed by somebody             0     1    2     3    4 
60) Secretly observing or peeping at a stranger             0     1    2     3    4 
61) Being secretly observed by a stranger              0     1    2     3    4 
62) Watching strangers have sex (while they’re not aware of it)           0     1    2     3    4 
63) Sex while watching soft pornography              0     1    2     3    4 
64) Sex while watching hard pornography              0     1    2     3    4 
65) Being watched while having sex               0     1    2     3    4 
66) Frottage (rubbing your genitals against a stranger without  
permission)                        0     1    2     3    4 
67) Making obscene sexual phone calls to a sexual partner            0     1    2     3    4 
68) Making obscene sexual phone calls to a stranger             0     1    2     3    4 
69) Receiving obscene sexual phone calls from a sexual partner           0     1    2     3    4 
70) Making threatening phone calls               0     1    2     3    4 
71) Receiving threatening phone calls              0     1    2     3    4 
72) Exposing your genitals to a stranger (without the stranger’s  
permission)                      0     1    2     3    4 
73) Using sex toys (e.g., dildos, inflatable dolls)             0     1    2     3    4 
74) Wearing kinky clothes (e.g., leather or rubber)             0     1    2     3    4 
75) Wearing sexy underwear                0     1    2     3    4 
76) Having a sexual partner give you a lap dance             0     1    2     3    4 
77) Having sex on the beach                0     1    2     3    4 
78) Having a sexual partner give you a playful striptease            0     1    2     3    4 
79) Kissing the neck of a sexual partner                       0     1    2     3    4 
80) Gently biting a sexual partner               0     1    2     3    4 
81) Nibbling the ear of a sexual partner                        0     1    2     3    4 
82) Being gently bitten by a sexual partner              0     1    2     3    4 
83) Receiving a massage                0     1    2     3    4 
84) Giving a massage                 0     1    2     3    4 
 
*Note:  This questionnaire was a version used in a previous study, and for the proposed 
dissertation project, it was adapted as an online version.  The online version is the same, except 
all items in this questionnaire were resorted in blocks of 4 according to perceived deviance (as 
per results of a previous study conducted by the PI).  In other words, each block of 4 questions 
consists of a non deviant, mildly deviant, moderately deviant, and very deviant item in a 
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randomized order.  Also, in the online format, each fantasy item is directly followed by a 
question asking about the frequency with which the participant masturbated to the fantasy, and 





Sexual Opinion Survey 
 Please respond to each item as honestly as you can. There are no right or wrong answers, and 
your answers will be completely confidential.  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
1. I think it would be very entertaining to look at hard-core pornography 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
I strongly                   I strongly 
  agree                   disagree 
 
2. Pornography is obviously filthy and people should not try to describe it as anything 
else.  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
I strongly                   I strongly 
  agree                                                                                                                       disagree                
 
3. Swimming in the nude with a member of the opposite sex would be an exciting 
experience.  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
      I strongly                  I strongly 
   agree                                 disagree 
 
4. Masturbation can be an exciting experience.  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
       I strongly                   I strongly 
   agree                   disagree 
 
5. If I found out that a close friend of mine was a homosexual, it would annoy me.  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
       I strongly                 I strongly 







6. If people thought that I was interested in oral sex, I would be embarrassed.  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
       I strongly                  I strongly 
     agree                 disagree 
 
7. Engaging in group sex is an entertaining idea.  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
        I strongly                        I strongly 
    agree          disagree 
 
8. I personally find that thinking about engaging in sexual intercourse is arousing.  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
        I strongly                        I strongly 
   agree           disagree 
 
9. Seeing a pornographic movie would be sexually arousing to me.  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
        I strongly                        I strongly 
   agree           disagree 
 
10. Thoughts that I may have homosexual tendencies would not worry me at all.  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
        I strongly                        I strongly 
   agree           disagree 
 
11. The idea of being physically attracted to members of the same sex is not depressing.  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
        I strongly                        I strongly 








12. Almost all pornographic material is nauseating.  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
        I strongly                        I strongly 
   agree           disagree 
 
13. It would be emotionally upsetting to me to see someone exposing themselves 
publicly.  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
        I strongly                        I strongly 
   agree           disagree 
 
14. Watching a gogo dancer of the opposite sex would not be very exciting.  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
        I strongly                        I strongly 
   agree           disagree 
 
15. I would not enjoy seeing a pornographic movie.  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
        I strongly                        I strongly 
   agree           disagree 
 
16. When I think about seeing pictures showing someone of the same sex as myself 
masturbating it nauseates me.  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
        I strongly                        I strongly 
   agree           disagree 
 
17. The thought of engaging in unusual sexual practices is highly arousing.  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
        I strongly                        I strongly 






18. Manipulating my genitals would probably be an arousing experience.  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
        I strongly                        I strongly 
   agree           disagree 
 
19. I do not enjoy daydreaming about sexual matters.  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
        I strongly                        I strongly 
   agree           disagree 
 
20. I am not curious about explicit pornography.  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
        I strongly                        I strongly 
   agree           disagree 
 
21. The thought of having long-term sexual relations with more than one sex partner is 
not disgusting to me.  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
        I strongly                        I strongly 





Oxford Happiness Inventory 
 
1. I don’t feel particularly pleased with the way I am 
1   2  3  4  5  6 
Strongly      Moderately Slightly Slightly Moderately  Strongly 
Disagree      Disagree             Disagree  Agree  Agree  Agree 
 
      
2. I am intensely interested in other people. 
1   2  3  4  5  6 
Strongly      Moderately Slightly Slightly Moderately  Strongly 
Disagree      Disagree             Disagree  Agree  Agree  Agree 
 
3. I feel that life is very rewarding. 
1   2  3  4  5  6 
Strongly      Moderately Slightly Slightly Moderately  Strongly 
Disagree      Disagree             Disagree  Agree  Agree  Agree 
 
      
4.  I have very warm feelings towards almost everyone. 
1   2  3  4  5  6 
Strongly      Moderately Slightly Slightly Moderately  Strongly 
Disagree      Disagree             Disagree  Agree  Agree  Agree 
 
      
5.  I rarely wake up feeling rested. 
1   2  3  4  5  6 
Strongly      Moderately Slightly Slightly Moderately  Strongly 
Disagree      Disagree             Disagree  Agree  Agree  Agree 
 
      
6.  I'm not particularly optimistic about the future. 
1   2  3  4  5  6 
Strongly      Moderately Slightly Slightly Moderately  Strongly 
Disagree      Disagree             Disagree  Agree  Agree  Agree 
 
 I find most things amusing. 
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1   2  3  4  5  6 
Strongly      Moderately Slightly Slightly Moderately  Strongly 




      
8.  I am always committed and involved. 
1   2  3  4  5  6 
Strongly      Moderately Slightly Slightly Moderately  Strongly 
Disagree      Disagree             Disagree  Agree  Agree  Agree 
 
      
9.  Life is good. 
1   2  3  4  5  6 
Strongly      Moderately Slightly Slightly Moderately  Strongly 
Disagree      Disagree             Disagree  Agree  Agree  Agree 
 
      
10.  I don't think that the world is a good place. 
1   2  3  4  5  6 
Strongly      Moderately Slightly Slightly Moderately  Strongly 
Disagree      Disagree             Disagree  Agree  Agree  Agree 
 
      
11.  I laugh a lot. 
1   2  3  4  5  6 
Strongly      Moderately Slightly Slightly Moderately  Strongly 
Disagree      Disagree             Disagree  Agree  Agree  Agree 
 
      
12.  I am well satisfied with everything in my life. 
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1   2  3  4  5  6 
Strongly      Moderately Slightly Slightly Moderately  Strongly 
Disagree      Disagree             Disagree  Agree  Agree  Agree 
 
      
13.  I don't think I look attractive. 
1   2  3  4  5  6 
Strongly      Moderately Slightly Slightly Moderately  Strongly 
Disagree      Disagree             Disagree  Agree  Agree  Agree 
 
      
14.  There's a gap between what I would like to do and what I have done. 
1   2  3  4  5  6 
Strongly      Moderately Slightly Slightly Moderately  Strongly 
Disagree      Disagree             Disagree  Agree  Agree  Agree 
 
      
 I am very happy. 
      
1   2  3  4  5  6 
Strongly      Moderately Slightly Slightly Moderately  Strongly 
Disagree      Disagree             Disagree  Agree  Agree  Agree 
 
 
16.  I find beauty in some things. 
1   2  3  4  5  6 
Strongly      Moderately Slightly Slightly Moderately  Strongly 
Disagree      Disagree             Disagree  Agree  Agree  Agree 
 
      
17.  I always have a cheerful effect on others. 
1   2  3  4  5  6 
Strongly      Moderately Slightly Slightly Moderately  Strongly 
Disagree      Disagree             Disagree  Agree  Agree  Agree 
 
      
18.  I can find time for everything I want to do. 
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1   2  3  4  5  6 
Strongly      Moderately Slightly Slightly Moderately  Strongly 




     
19.  I feel that I'm not especially in control of my life. 
1   2  3  4  5  6 
Strongly      Moderately Slightly Slightly Moderately  Strongly 
Disagree      Disagree             Disagree  Agree  Agree  Agree 
 
      
20.  I feel able to take anything on. 
1   2  3  4  5  6 
Strongly      Moderately Slightly Slightly Moderately  Strongly 
Disagree      Disagree             Disagree  Agree  Agree  Agree 
 
      
21.  I feel fully mentally alert. 
1   2  3  4  5  6 
Strongly      Moderately Slightly Slightly Moderately  Strongly 
Disagree      Disagree             Disagree  Agree  Agree  Agree 
 
      
22.  I often experience joy and elation. 
1   2  3  4  5  6 
Strongly      Moderately Slightly Slightly Moderately  Strongly 
Disagree      Disagree             Disagree  Agree  Agree  Agree 
 
      
23.  I don't find it easy to make decisions. 
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1   2  3  4  5  6 
Strongly      Moderately Slightly Slightly Moderately  Strongly 
Disagree      Disagree             Disagree  Agree  Agree  Agree 
 
24. I don't have a particular sense of meaning and purpose in my life. 
1   2  3  4  5  6 
Strongly      Moderately Slightly Slightly Moderately  Strongly 
Disagree      Disagree             Disagree  Agree  Agree  Agree 
 
 
      
25.  I feel I have a great deal of energy. 
1   2  3  4  5  6 
Strongly      Moderately Slightly Slightly Moderately  Strongly 
Disagree      Disagree             Disagree  Agree  Agree  Agree 
 
      
26.  I usually have a positive influence on events. 
1   2  3  4  5  6 
Strongly      Moderately Slightly Slightly Moderately  Strongly 
Disagree      Disagree             Disagree  Agree  Agree  Agree 
 
      
27.  I don't have fun with other people. 
1   2  3  4  5  6 
Strongly      Moderately Slightly Slightly Moderately  Strongly 
Disagree      Disagree             Disagree  Agree  Agree  Agree 
 
      
28.  I don't feel particularly healthy. 
1   2  3  4  5  6 
Strongly      Moderately Slightly Slightly Moderately  Strongly 
Disagree      Disagree             Disagree  Agree  Agree  Agree 
 
      
29.  I don't have particularly happy memories of the past. 
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1   2  3  4  5  6 
Strongly      Moderately Slightly Slightly Moderately  Strongly 





State-Trait Depression Scales, Trait Subscale 
 
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given below. Read 
each statement and then circle the appropriate number to the right of the statement to indicate 
how you generally feel. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on 
any one statement but give the answer which seems to describe how you generally feel. 
 
1. I feel gloomy.  
1   2  3  4   
Almost      Sometimes Often  Almost 
Never                     Always  
 
2. I feel happy. 
1   2  3  4   
Almost      Sometimes Often  Almost 
Never                     Always 
 
3. I feel depressed. 
1   2  3  4   
Almost      Sometimes Often  Almost 
Never                     Always 
 
4. I feel sad. 
1   2  3  4   
Almost      Sometimes Often  Almost 
Never                     Always 
 
5. I feel hopeless. 
1   2  3  4   
Almost      Sometimes Often  Almost 
Never                     Always 
 
 
*This questionnaire is not allowed to be reproduced in its entirety (10-items) due to a copyright 
agreement I made with the licensing company (Mindgarden.com), but I am permitted to 





Marlowe-Crown Short Form version C (M-C Form C) 
Instructions:  Please answer the following questions by circling the best answer. 
(1)  It is sometimes hard for me to go on                                     
with my work if I am not encouraged. 
 
True                  False 




True                  False 
(3)  On a few occasions, I have given up doing 





True                  False 
(4)  There have been times when I felt like 
rebelling against people in authority even 




True                  False 
(5)  No matter who I’m talking to, I’m always 
a good listener. 
 
 
True                  False 
(6)  There have been occasions when I took 
advantage of someone. 
 
 
True                  False 




True                  False 
(8)  I sometimes try to get even rather than 
forgive or forget. 
 
 
True                  False 




True                  False 
(10)  I have never been irked when people 
expressed ideas very different from my own. 
 
 
True                  False 
(11)  There have been times when I was quite 
jealous of the good fortune of others. 
 
 
True                  False 
(12)  I am sometimes irritated by people who 
ask favors of me. 
 
 
True                  False 
(13)  I have never deliberately said something 
to hurt someone’s feelings. 
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